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Abstract 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Migration, Language Politics and their 
Relations with Russia 
Steven Andrew Miles, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
Supervisor:  Thomas J. Garza 
This report compares and contrasts Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s relations with 
Russia and how domestic politics influences those relations. This report will analyze how 
these relations are conducted in three themes: language policy, migrant labor from these 
countries to Russia, and the international relations of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan vis-à-vis 
Russia.  
The first chapter provides an overview of the Soviet nationalities policy. First, the 
chapter will summarize the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs. Second, it will 
explore Kazakh and Uzbek nationalist movements that were active in Central Asia before 
the formation of the Soviet Union. Finally, the chapter will explore process of the formation 
of the Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
The second chapter is concerned with the language policies of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. The chapter will show how the Soviet authorities promoted the use of the 
vi
Uzbek and Kazakh languages. It will show how codification, standardization and 
orthographic reforms were not only components of Soviet language policy, but also 
language of polices of these modern, independent Central Asian states. 
The third chapter explores the international relations of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
vis-à-vis Russia. Using a theoretical framework, It will compare and contrast the 
approaches of the governments of these states towards Russia and how domestic policies 
concerning national security are connected with foreign policy. 
The fourth and final chapter examines labor migration from Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan to Russia. Using data from the Russian government, World Bank and other 
organization, It will look at how labor migrants from these countries contribute to their 
respective economies though remittances. Additionally, this chapter will examine how the 
government of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan view migrant labor originating from their 
respective countries.  
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Introduction 
On February 12, 2013 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published Concept 
of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. It was approved by President Vladimir 
Putin and in provision sixty-three of the document--which concerns NATO--it states, 
“Russia maintains a negative attitude towards NATO’s expansion and to the approaching 
of NATO military infrastructure to Russia’s borders in general as to actions that violate the 
principle of equal security and lead to the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe.”1  
To be sure, the document takes a conciliatory tone towards NATO and argues that 
both Russia and the organization have common interest and goals such as the combatting 
of terrorism, but the preceding quote is indicative of a common attitude towards NATO in 
Russia. Russia believes that NATO (not without cause) seeks to impinge itself in the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU). Evidence of this can be seen in Georgia’s plan to join NATO 
and Estonia’s recent consent to the establishment of a NATO base on its territory. Last but 
not least, the Maidan revolts in Kiev  were symbolic of a nation (or at least part of one) 
wanting to orient itself away from Moscow towards Brussels, and by default, NATO. 
However, one does not see such tension in former Soviet republics to the south, that 
is to say Central Asia. There have been border skirmishes here and there, for example, on 
the border of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but there are no conflicts on the scale that we 
see in Ukraine to the present day and Georgia in 2008. Having said that, this does not mean 
that the republics of Central Asia are completely subservient to Russia. Far from it, they 




chart their own path in the world and modify their foreign policy in accordance with their 
respective national interests.  
 In this study I will examine how Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan differ in their 
approach to Russia. I have chosen Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan not only for brevity, but 
also because of the relative influence the countries hold in the region. According to the CIA 
World Fact Book Uzbekistan is the largest country in Central Asia by population at nearly 
29 million individuals.2 It also possesses the largest agricultural center in the region along 
with Kyrgyzstan.  
Kazakhstan is, according to the World Bank, the strongest economy in the region. 
Its GDP grew 400% between 2005 and 2013. It is the twelfth-largest exporter of oil in the 
world and the CIA World Fact Book states that its economy is heavily dependent on 
resource extraction.3 Additionally, Russians make up a significant minority in the country, 
and they are a majority of the population in the northern regions. With such 
interconnectedness, Kazakhstan shares much with Russia both linguistically and culturally.  
Uzbekistan vacillates between Russia and the West (here understood to be the EU 
and United States). Islom Karimov’s policy can be what Pikalov characterizes as “multi-
vectoring”. In multi-vectoring a small nation will play two great powers off of each other 
to maximize benefits.4 In the case of Uzbekistan, Karimov does this in order to maintain 
                                                 
2 CIA World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html. 
According to the Fact Book Turkmenistan as has a population of over 5 million, Kazakhstan nearly 18 
million, Kyrgyzstan 5.6 million, and Tajikistan 8 million.  
3 Countries, US Energy Information Administration, [December 1, 2013] 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfurm?topL=exp. 
4 Aleksandr Pikalov, “Uzbekistan Between the Great Powers: A Balancing Act or Multi-Vectoring 
Approach,” in Central Asian Studies, vol XXXIII, no 3, 297. 
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regime stability. This is the most important factor for any actions that Karimov takes in 
respect to the security of Uzbekistan; whether it is religious repression, the imprisonment 
of his own daughter Gulnara, or purchasing technology and military equipment from the 
United States as opposed to Russia.  
In the case of Kazakhstan, its foreign policy is also characterized by multi-
vectoring, but it is less cynical and more nuanced in terms of motivation. Idrissov, the 
foreign minister, argued in the Astana Times that, “Our foreign policy is not only active, 
but also multi-vectored – this is the most reasonable approach coded in the nomads’ blood 
and explained by our history and geography,”5 Thus, Kazakhstan is using this self-
characterization to explain why is has close ties to Russia, but also does business with the 
EU and the United States.  
In this study I shall look at four themes which I believe are important for describing 
both Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia. It will arranged thematically 
by chapters in which I will compare and contrast the countries’ approach towards Russia. 
I believe that this organizational format—as opposed to arrangement by country—will 
provide a more cohesive  flow and will make this study easier to follow. The themes which 
I will examine are listed below. 
Firstly, I will provide an overview of Soviet nationalities policy. The emergence of 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as independent states in the early 1990s would not be possible 
without the creation of those nations by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. The goal of the 
                                                 
5 Malika Orazgalieva, “Kazakh FM Says Multi-Vectored Foreign Policy Rooted in Nomadic History, 
Geography,” in Astana Times, July 3, 2014, http://www.astanatimes.com/2014/07/kazakh-fm-says-multi-
vectored-foreign-policy-rooted-nomadic-history-geography/, [Accessed December 1, 2014]  
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creation of these two Central Asian states was a push for modernization; modernization 
which took the form of defensive nationalism and the building of social institutions such 
as academies of science and the development of national language.  
 In the second chapter I will cover a related theme, language policy. I will touch on 
the Soviet language policy in this chapter, and then move on to modern issues. I will look 
at the differences between the alphabets of Kazakh and Uzbek and their respective political 
ramifications, as well as the position of the Russian language in both countries. I believe 
that an examination of language policy is very important for understanding the nature of 
these two countries’ relationship with Russia because it describes the importance of the 
Russian language and is a symbol of Russia’s soft power. 
 The next issue which I will discuss is how domestic policies are interconnected 
with the foreign policies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Both Karimov and Nazarbayev 
use the threat of radical Islam as a trope for the maintenance of their regimes. Uzbekistan 
cooperates with international actors such a foreign governments and private corporations 
for the strengthening of local security services. Kazakhstan is not as severe in its 
persecution of Islam, but it does place onerous restrictions on religious organizations.  
 The fourth chapter will focus on labor migration from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
to Russia. I will examine the number of migrants traveling to Russia from these two 
countries each year and look at the economic impact they have their respective countries, 
if any. I will also examine the attitudes that the governments of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
take towards labor migrants in Russia.
5
Chapter 1: 
Nationalities Policy in Central Asia 
In August 2014, during a question-and-answer session at the Seliger Youth Camp 
in the Tver oblast’, Vladimir Putin stated that Kazakhstan “never had any statehood.” He 
also praised Nazarbayev, in a back-handed manner, for “creating a state in a territory that 
had never had a state before.” 
Possibly, this is simple nationalist bluster. The Seliger Youth Camp is a creation of 
Nashi, the youth wing of Putin’s party, United Russia, after the “Color Revolutions” swept 
the former Soviet Union in 2005.1 In this lights, Vladimir Putin was sending political 
signals to russophones in both Kazakhstan and Russia indicating that he had their security 
and interests under his watch.  
Political blustering aside, the ideas behind Putin’s words are significant. He is 
arguing that Kazakhstan is relatively new nation and that the Kazakhs as an ethnic group 
were a relatively new designation. Putin believes this because the modern state of 
Kazakhstan is new in the sense of its borders. That is to say,  Kazakhstan is a creation of 
the Soviet Union. The creation of the modern state of Kazakhstan, as well as the other 
nations of the former Soviet Union , was the result of a Soviet policy of promoting national 
and ethnic solidarity through the establishment of administrative units such as union 
republics. 
1 Farangis Nijabullah, “Putin Downplays Kazakh Independence, Sparks Angry Reaction”, RFE/RL, 
September 2, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-putin-history-reaction-nation/26565141.html 
[Accessed September 4, 2014]; Julia Ioffe, “Russia’s Nationalist Summer Camp”, The New Yorker, 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/russias-nationalist-summer-camp, [Accessed April 23, 2015] 
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The story of the creation of the modern states of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is the 
topic of this chapter and represents a crucial period in the history of Central Asia. The 
borders of the majority of the modern states in Central Asia were formed between 1924 
and 1929 by the Soviet authorities with the help of local elites such as the Alash Orda and 
Jadid movements of Kazakhstan and modern Uzbekistan, respectively.  This process is 
broadly referred to in current scholarship as “Soviet nationalities policy.”2 
The nationalities policy of the Soviet Union was aimed at creating Soviet socialist 
republics (SSRs) based the majority indigenous ethnicity. These SSRs would serve to 
modernize the “backwards” peoples of the former Russian Empire. As a characteristic, 
cultural backwardness was seen as a roadblock to modernization efforts whose goals were 
to develop capitalism, and eventually socialism, throughout the former Russian Empire.3   
This modernization would come in the form of the promotion of a local sense of national 
identity. Before I discuss this doctrine, however, I will briefly recount the origins of the 
Uzbek and Kazakh nations.  
 
The Origins of the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs 
The modern states of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (in terms of their contemporary 
borders) were creations of the Soviet Union, however the Kazakh and Uzbek people go 
                                                 
2 Terry Martin, Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1929, 
[Ithaca: Cornell University Press] 2001; Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and 
the Making of the Soviet Union, [Ithaca: Cornell University Press] 2005; Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a 
Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” Slavic Review LIII, no 2, 
414-452. 
3 Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North, [Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994], 220. 
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back to at least the fourteenth century for the Uzbeks, and the fifteenth century for the 
Kazakhs.4 It is important to note the meaning of these ethnonyms have fluctuated over the 
centuries and I will briefly summarize these changes starting with the Uzbeks. 
The term Uzbek originates from Uzbek Khan, a leader of the Golden Horde who 
ruled from 1313-1341.5 Quoting seventeenth-century court chronicler Abul Ghazi, 
Allworth writes, “After that [conversion of the Golden Horde to Islam by Uzbek6 Khan 
(brackets author’s)], they called the entire tribe [il/el] of Juchi the people of Uzbek and 
most assuredly will say so until the Judgment Day.”7  
Allworth argues that those who call themselves Uzbeks today are ethnically 
different from those who did so in the fourteenth century. The first population were Tatars 
who had left the Golden Horde and journeyed east from Saray, the capital. The second 
population appeared in the 1380s, around the same time as rise of Tamerlane. Outsiders 
used the appellation ‘Uzbek’ and it referred to Turko-Mongol people living to the north of 
Samarkand and outside of the jurisdiction of Tamerlane.8 
 The modern Uzbeks consists of three constituent populations: first, the Tatars 
mentioned above who came to inhabit the Dashti-Kipchak, or the Kipchak Plain; second, 
                                                 
4 Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, [Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1990], 32.; Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, [Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995, 
9. 
5 Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, [Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1990], 32. 
6 Uzbek is spelled O’zbek in the Uzbek language. O’z is reflexive pronoun, and beg is cognate with the 
Turkish word bey, or noble. This translates to “his own master”.  
7   Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, A Cultural 
History, [Standford: Hoover Institution Press] 1990: 30.  
8 Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, A Cultural 
History, [Standford: Hoover Institution Press] 1990., 31-33. 
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another Turkic element consisting of the Oghuz and Chagatay confederation; finally, a 
sedentary Persian element known as the Shaybanids.9 
Like the ethnonym Uzbek, the term Kazakh came to have different meanings over 
time. The word “Kazakh” initially meant the rulers of a Turkic confederation who went 
into political exile and split from the Uzbeks in the fifteenth century. Also like the Uzbeks, 
they are the result of an amalgamation of different peoples. The Uzbeks and Kazakhs were, 
up until the fifteenth century, intertwined.10 
The Kazakhs split from the Uzbeks of the Syr Darya region in the fifteenth century 
over a dynastic dispute. While the Tatars from the Golden Horde ruled that region it began 
to fracture into two tribes, or kollar (lit. arms or flanks). Shiban, the fifth son of Jochi Khan, 
ruled the kol in in the Tobol basin (modern western Siberia) and his descendants Janibek  
separated from the kol in the Syr Darya after his father Barak was killed and Janibek 
jockeyed for control of the khanate with Abdul Khayr., the khan of Transoxiana.11 
Like the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs were not the first people to inhabit their current state. 
An Iranian tribe called the Scythian had inhabited southern Kazakhstan since the third 
century BC, until the Usun, a Mongolian people, overran them in 73 BC. Between the first 
half of the first century AD and the fourteenth, the Arabs and various Turkic confederations 
                                                 
9 Alisher Ilkhamov, “Archaeology of Uzbek Identity”, Central Asian Survey, XXIII, 3, 289-326, p 300; 
This Persian element would come to dominate the Uzbek language. Most Turkic languages have a feature 
known as vowel harmony, which is the concept of front or back vowel agreement necessitated when 
employing agglutination. However, Uzbek does not have this feature because of its significant amount of 
Persianization, both lexographically and grammatically.  
10 H.B. Paskoy, “Z.V. Togan: The Origins of the Kazaks and the O’zbeks,” in Central Asian Survey, XI, 3 
83-100, 89; Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, [Stanford, Hoover Institute Press] 1990, 3.  
11 Ibid.  
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including the Karluk, Chagatai and Altai invaded the area. By 1513, the Kazakhs under 
Qasim Khan got as far south as modern-day Tashkent, but was not able to overcome it 
because of the economic and military superiority of the Shaybanis. Thus, by this period, 
the Kazakhs had settled what is today the modern state of Kazakhstan.12 
Unlike the Uzbeks, however, the Kazakhs were primarily nomadic. Generally, they 
did not have a settled society and were not Persianized in terms of language and culture. 
There was, however, certainly a sense of Kazakh identity. For example, while the Kazakhs 
were split off into three hordes (a system which continues to this day in the form of the 
Great, Middle and Small clans), there was an oral tradition in the form of the Legend of 
Alash which, Olcott argues,  was  utilized  in order to create a sense of commonality among 
the three clans.13  
This brief review of the ethnogenisis of the Kazakhs and Uzbeks provides a 
background into how the Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Bolshevik authorities were able to form 
identities around which these two peoples of Central Asia could coalesce.  
Soviet Nationalities Policy 
The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not 
got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to 
be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so far, itself 
national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.14 
 
                                                 
12 Marth Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, 9.  
13 Ibid., 11.  
14 Karl Marx, “The Communist Manifesto”, Marxist Internet Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch02.htm 
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The above quotation is taken from the second chapter of The Communist Manifesto. 
Its implication is twofold: first, the bourgeoisie controlled the identity of the nation, while 
the proletariat labored for them; second, the proletariat had no sense of nation at all; they 
only identified themselves as workers. This is a conundrum that Lenin faced in 1917. As 
the inheritor of a massive, mostly non-industrial empire, he needed to find a way not only 
to move Russia along the path towards modernity, but also to promote this modernity in a 
largely rural steppe region interspersed with a handful of khanates.     
 Marx himself did not believe it was possible for countries such as Russia to 
modernize and become suitable candidate for the communist revolution. As van Ree 
argues, Marx and Engels believed that Russians and other Slavs were backward people 
who were incapable of organizing and inclined towards conservatism and supporting 
counter-revolutions.15 Indeed, Engels was given to xenophobia and wrote in an editorial 
entitles Democratic Pan-Slavism: 
To the sentimental phrases about brotherhood which we are being offered here on 
behalf of the most counter-revolutionary nations of Europe, we reply that hatred of 
Russians was and still is the primary revolutionary passion among Germans; that 
since the revolution hatred of Czechs and Croats has been added, and that only by 
the most determined use of terror against these Slav peoples can we, jointly with 
the Poles and Magyars, safeguard the revolution.16 
 
In this light, how did Lenin and Stalin reconcile this paradox? How could they 
reform the former Russian Empire, which had nowhere near the level of industrialization 
                                                 
15 Erik van Ree, The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A Study in Twentieth-Century Revolutionary 
Patriotism, 51 
16 Frederick Engels, “Democratic Pan-Slavism,” Neue Rheinische Zeitung February 1849, 
https://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/marx/works/1849/02/15.htm, [Accessed February, 12 2015] 
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as Germany and Britain? Pipes writes that Lenin believed that non-Marxist methods could 
be used to advance the cause of the revolution.17 One of these methods was the fostering 
of the development of nationalism among the peoples of the former Russian Empire. This 
nationalism could only take a certain form, however. 
 For Lenin there were two kinds of nationalism: bourgeois, great power nationalism 
and defensive nationalism. Great power nationalism is exemplified by Russian nationalism, 
while defensive nationalism would be Uzbek nationalism, for example. He expressed this 
view in The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination: 
…if we want to grasp the meaning of self-determination of nations, not by juggling 
with legal definitions, or “inventing” abstract definitions, but by examining the 
historico-economic conditions of the national movements, we must inevitably reach 
the conclusion that the self-determination of nations means the political separation 
of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent 
national state.18 
 
The “alien national bodies” were the European empire, such as the British and 
French, that predominated in 1914 when this article was published. In order for proletariats 
to form among the peoples of the former Russian Empire, they needed their own national 
identities. As Martin argues, Stalin and Lenin both believed that a people need to pass 
through the evolutionary stage of capitalism in order to develop national identity.  Indeed 
Stalin wrote in Marxism and the National Question: 
The nation is not simply a historical category, but a historically defined category 
belonging to the epochs, the epochs of rising capitalism. The process of the 
                                                 
17 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, 
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964], 35. 
18 VI Lenin, “The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination.” The Marxist Internet Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ch01.htm [Accessed September 25, 2014] 
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liquidation of feudalism and the growth of capitalism is shown to coincide with the 
constitution of the nation.19 
 
Border formation is the key example of the “constitution of the nation”. Stalin 
wrote, “The nation, it is, above all, a fixed community of people…, the nation, it is not 
racial or tribal, but a historically evolved community of people…, the nation, it is not 
random nor conglomerate, but a fixed community of people.”20  
Further, he argues that territory is an integral part of national identity. A common 
cultural descent shared by two peoples who live in different territories is not an indicator 
of a unitary nation. Concerning the English and Americans, Stalin wrote: 
First of all, that they [the English and Americans] don’t live in a common. The 
nation is formed only as the result of long-term and regular intercourse as a result 
of living together from generation to generation. But long-term, combined living is 
not possible without common territory. The English and the American used to be a 
common people in one territory, England, and consisted of one nation.  
But that is not all. A common territory does not make a nation. For this we need, 
more over, a common domestic economy, uniting separate parts into one unit. 
Between England and North America no such connection exists, and, as a result, 
there are two separate nations.21  
 
From these quotations we can draw three conclusions: first, capitalism was, in 
Stalin’s mind, a necessary evolutionary stage for the growth of national identity; second, a 
nation develops over time and it is a community which shares common cultural traits; third, 
a nation needs a common territory and economy in order to be considered unique. 
                                                 
19  JV Stalin, “Marksizm i Natsional’nyi Vopros”, Marxist Internet Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/russkij/stalin/t2/marxism_nationalism.htm 
 




 Therefore, border formation was a necessary component of Soviet nationalities 
policy. In order to develop nationalism among the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs, republics 
needed to be created bearing their names. Once they had a common territory, the Uzbeks 
and the Kazakhs would be able to develop capitalism and eventually socialism.  
 As Hirsch writes, Soviet ethnographers, who did field research in order to create 
borders which they believed corresponded to nations, classified groups of people into four 
stages: plemia (tribe), narodnost’ (nationality), narod (people), and natsiia (nation)22. 
Those people who were further up the evolutionary latter in terms of cultural development 
were granted territorial administrative units in this ascending order of importance: 
autonomous oblast’, autonomous okrug, autonomous republic, and Soviet Socialist 
Republic (SSR).23  
 None of this is to say that there were no pre-existing intellectual movements among 
the Kazakhs and Uzbeks seeking to improve their respective positions within the former 
Russian Empire. The Bolsheviks did not need to start from scratch and develop every social 
institution. Indeed, after the 1905 revolution in St Petersburg and Moscow, many of the 
                                                 
22 Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 36. This categorization is a complex and deep topic, but I will summarize 
it with analogies provided by Stalin. The Americans and the English have a common language, but are 
narody, not natsii because they do not have a common territory; but the Italians are a nation. He writes, 
“The nation—it is, above all, a community, fixed community of people. This community, it is not racial 
and not tribal. The modern Italian state consists of Romans, Germanic tribes, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs and 
so on.” Ibid. He does not provide an example of a narodnost’, but in my own opinion, a modern analogy 
might be the Irish in Northern Ireland.  
23 An oblast’ is roughly equivalent to a province. Most oblasts were located in European Russia and in 
many cases were populated by Russians. However, there are many cases of ethnically-based oblasts such as 
the Chechen Autonomous Oblast’. An okrug is a large area of land that was sparsely inhabited and 
typically located on the fringes of Russia.  An Autonomous Republic is a culturally autonomous region 
whose inhabitants were not judged to be culturally developed enough to have an independent SSR. 
 14 
peoples of the Russian Empire began to develop a political consciousness. An example of 
this development can be found in the Armenian independence movement known as 
Dashnaktsutiun, which agitated for independence for independence from the Ottoman 
Empire and the creation of a separate Transcaucasian state.24 Like the Armenians, the 
Kazakhs and Uzbeks also had their own social movements. 
 The first example of such developing social movements is the Jadids (from Turkic 
usul-i-Jadid, or new method), an intellectual movement which was prominent among 
Volga and Crimean  Tatars, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Iranians and Muslim of the Ottoman Empire  
in the late nineteenth century. The Jadids recognized the benefits of European forms of 
education. This belief was characteristic of a wider application of European ideas and 
methods of education in the Islamic world during the late 1800s and early 1900s in reaction 
to colonialism. 
 As Khalid argues, this reaction was not necessarily  negative and motivated by 
nationalism. Rather, it was a response to changing economic realities. The Russian empire 
introduced its own forms of education into Central Asia, and these were enthusiastically 
adopted by the movement. Above all else, the Jadids offered a critique of Islam in Central 
Asia.25  
 For our purposes, Ismael Gasprinski, a Crimean Tatar who studied in Istanbul and 
the Sorbonne in Paris brought the ideas of the Jadids to the Russian Empire. He believed 
                                                 
24 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, 
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964], 19. 
25 Abeed Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia, [Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1998],  
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that by educating Muslims in the sciences, languages such as Russian, mathematics and 
engineering a new generation would arise who could assert their Muslim and Turkestani 
identity and move society forward towards a new modernity. Indeed, even the term 
“Turkestan” was coined by the Jadids.26 
 However, it would be a mistake to think that the Jadids were separatists, at least at 
the beginning. While it is true that the conservative Islamic clergy (the opponents of the 
Jadids) were supported by the Russian Empire in an attempt to ensure stability in the 
region27, the Jadids simply aimed at modernizing Islam and integrating it into Russian 
imperial society.  
 Due to heavy opposition from the clergy, the Jadids were forced into the arms of 
the Bolsheviks in 1918 out of political necessity. As Roy writes, the Tsarist government 
had supported the conservative Muslim ulema (religious elite) for the purposes of 
maintaining stability. If St. Petersburg had supporting reformers such as the Jadids, it could 
possibly risk alienating the ulema and lead to the entrenchment of more fundamentalist 
forms of Islam.28 Led by Admiral Kolchak, the White Forces (the forces fighting against 
the Bolsheviks during the Civil War) continued to support both the ulema and the emirs of 
the emirites of Khiva and Bukhara until they fell to the Bolsheviks.29 
                                                 
26 Kanat Kaldybekovich Bazarbayev, Assel Gumadullayeva, Muhabbat Rustambekova; “Jadidism 
Phenomenon in Central Asia,” in Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, LXXXIX no 13, 876-881, 877. 
 
27   Abeed Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia, [Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1998]: 82. 
 
28   Oilvier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, [New York: New York University Press]: 
33. 
29 Ibid., 43-44. 
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 After the fall of Tashkent (a Russian-dominated city) to the Bolsheviks in the 
ensuing Civil War, the final Emir of Bukhara, Said Alim Khan, pushed back and was able 
to defeat the Russians and the their Jadid allies. However, Bukhara and the Emirate of 
Khiva fell to the Bolsheviks in 1920 due to the exhaustion of the Muslims from the Civil 
War.30  
 The Kazakhs also had their own nationalism movement, Alash Orda, or Horde of 
Alash.31 Alash Orda arose from the same conditions as the Jadids after the 1905 
Revolution. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian empire had marginalized the 
ordinary Kazakh nomad and pushed them out of the northern regions of modern-day 
Kazakhstan; forcing them into a sedentary life style.32  
 Like the Jadids, Alash Orda believed that the Kazakhs should orient themselves 
towards the Russian Empire, not towards Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. However, 
unlike the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs were only Islamized in the second half of the nineteenth 
century by Tatar missionaries sent by the Russian Empire. Before that, Islam was only 
informally practiced by the Kazakhs.33 
  During the Civil War, Alash Orda was initially on the side of the White Forces; 
however, Kolchak’s increasingly dictatorial actions drove it towards the Red Army. 
Unfortunately, the Bolsheviks never took Alash Orda seriously and ignored their demands 
                                                 
30   Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, 
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964], 177-184. 
31   Alash is a figure from Kazakh folklore 
32   Bahvna Dave, Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language, Power, [New York: Routledge. 2007], 43. 
33   Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, [Standford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990], 102-103. 
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for autonomy. Until 1924, present-day Kazakhstan was included in the Russian SSR and 
made into an autonomous Republic called the Kazakh-Kyrgyz AR.34 
 While these nationalist parties did exist in Central Asia, the Bolsheviks still 
believed that nations had yet to be developed in this region. Before 1924, Central Asia, 
with the exception Kazakhstan, was designated as the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ASSR). This unit was broken up in 1924 into the five countries we 
know today as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.35 
 Hirsch argues that the new secular elites in Turkestan such as the Jadids and 
member of Alash Orda played a rule in the delimitation of the Turkestan ASSR into the 
five countries we know today. She argues against the theory of “divide and conquer” 
advocated by Pipes in the creation of five SSRs from the Turkestan and Kyrgyz ASSRs. 
Instead of Moscow playing the soul role in delimitation, the Bolsheviks worked with 
national elites. Hirsch writes: 
Soviet leaders argued that the fate of the revolution depended on the ethnohistorical 
development of all the lands and peoples within its borders. They chose to 
recognize Central Asia along national, and not tribal, lines because they saw “the 
nation” as a modern (postfeudal) form of social and economic organization.36 
 
                                                 
34   Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, 174. Later imperial ethnographers were not able to 
distinguish Kyrgyz from Kazakh. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz languages were similar enough that Russians 
could not tell the difference, thus until 1924 Kazakhstan was Kyrgyz AR, and Kyrgyzstan was called the 
Kara-Kyrgzy SSR. 
35   Originally, Tajikistan was an Autonomous Republic of Uzbekistan. In 1929 it would become an 
independent SSR.  
36 Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union, 
[Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005], 164. 
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The course of “ethnohistorical development” was not, however, determined by 
local people. Ethnography was used by the Bolsheviks as a tool for control in their 
borderlands. Like anthropology in the nineteenth century, ethnography was used for the 
execution of power. The Soviets employed ethnographers of the former Russian Empire in 
order to conduct studies in Central Asia. 
These ethnographers operated under the assumption that language was a reliable 
indicator of ethnicity. This was not always the case. For example, a person could not always 
say if he or she was Kazakh, Turkmen or Uzbek.  Sometimes, people were bilingual; 
particularly in modern-day Uzbekistan, where a person could speak both Turkic and Tajik. 
Such an indicator could not always be reliable and did lead to border regions 
between the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan SSRs being ethnically mixed. Hirsch cites a 
particular example in the Tashkent uezd. The Tashkent uezd was dominated by Uzbeks, 
who had a majority share of 47.3% of the population. Kyrgyz and Kazakhs wrote to 
Moscow complaining about mistreatment at the hand of the Uzbeks.  
Thus, the formation of borders in the Soviet Union was based primarily on censuses 
and ethnographic work. While Russians primarily dominate the northern regions of 
Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan received this region because it was inhabited by Kazakh nomads 
well before the Russian settlers arrived.   
As for Uzbekistan, in addition to Tashkent, it received Bukhara. However, Bukhara 
and Samarkand, two predominantly Persian (Tajik)-speaking cities were made part of the 
territory of the Uzbek SSR. As above, inhabitants of the Turkestan ASSR did not attach 
importance to ethnicity and often spoke two languages, Uzbek and Persian. These bilingual 
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people were known as Sarts. Sarts were defined as settled, bilingual inhabitants who spoke 
a Turkic language and Persian. Ilkhamov, while acknowledging that the term has a long 
history in Central Asia, argues that the Bolsheviks used it as a way to prevent ethnic 
solidarity in Turkestan. Further, he argues that the term “Sart” was perceived as a social 
designation by the local population.  
The discussion in this chapter covered Soviet nationalities policy in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. This area of Soviet history is quite complex, but for the purposes of outlining 
the formation of modern day Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan I believe that it provides a basic 
summary and commentary of the most significant events. The next chapter covers language 
policy. Language policies in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are heavily influenced by 













Chapter 2: Language Policy 
 
Language policy is a very important part of Soviet nationalities policy. The reasons 
for its significance is twofold: First, language policy is not simply a relic of the Soviet era, 
but is still in practice now in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Second, modern language 
policies in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are inherently a reaction to the position that the 
Russian language held in these states during the Soviet period. The current policies, whose 
purpose is to enforce the preeminence of the Uzbek and Kazakh languages, would not exist 
without the influence of the Soviet nationalities policy. 
  This chapter recounts how the Uzbek and Kazakh languages were given a place of 
prominence at the beginning of the Soviet era, and later lost their preeminence in favor of 
Russian. It describes how Uzbek and Kazakh were promoted in the workplace in an attempt 
to promote nationalism, but were later replaced by Russian. Additionally, this chapter 
considers what impact orthographic reforms had on these two languages, both during the 
Soviet period and in modern times.   
After independence, numerous language laws were issued in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan in order to give these languages a larger role in society.1 This chapter will 
explore the impact of these laws and look the continued use of Russian by not only ethnic 
Russians, but by Kazakhs and Uzbeks as well.  
                                                 
1  Birgit N Schlyter, “New Language Laws in Uzbekistan”, in Language Problems and Language 
Planning, vol XXII no 2, 143-181, 144; Barbara Kellner-Heinkele; Jacob M. Landau, Language Politics in 
Contemporary Central Asia: National and Ethnic Identity in Central Asia, [London: I.B. Tauris, 2012], 86 
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 This study is thematic and will be organized according to country. It is then 
subdivided by period. Furthermore, since each topic reemerges both during the period of 
nationalities policy and after independence, I will also subdivide each language between 
historical periods. Additionally, I will add a perambulatory section on the definition of 
language policy and a general overview of the linguistic situations in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan.  
Languages of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are home to many different languages. Due their 
location along the old Silk Road, the languages of these countries came into contact with 
many different cultures. Thus, what is now Uzbek and Kazakh have been influenced by 
Persian, Arabic, Mongolian and, more recently, Russian, in addition to their Turkic 
substrate.  
According to Ethnologue, Kazakhstan is home to wide variety of languages 
including German, Uyghur, and Tatar, in addition to Kazakh, Russian and Ukrainian.2 
According to another report, Kazakhstan is also home to Korean, Finnish and Ingush.3 The 
presence of German and Ingush is a result of forced relocation under Stalin during World 
War 2. The continued existence of Ingush and German in Kazakhstan is a result of these 
ethnic groups integrating into Kazakh society and not finding a reason to return to Germany 
and Ingushetia; though there are certainly some who have returned.4 
                                                 
2 Kazakh, http://www.ethnologue.com/country/KZ/languages, [Accessed April 1, 2015]  
3 Juldyz Smagulova, “Language Policies of Kazakhization and their Influence on Language Attitudes and 
Use,” International Journal on Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, XI no 3 and 4, 440-475, 442. 
4 Antonine Blau, “Kazakhstan: Chechens Mark 60th Anniversary of Deportation”, RFE/RL, February 23, 
2004, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051641.html, [Accessed April 1, 2015]; David Swansnson, 
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Kazakh is a Turkic language. It is a member of Aralo-Caspian subgroup of Turkic, 
which also includes Kipchak, Karakalpak and Kyrgyz. Like most Turkic languages, it is 
characterized by agglutination and vowel harmony.5 Vowel harmony is the phonological 
phenomenon of vowel agreement between front and back vowels, which governs 
agglutination (the formation of words using several suffixes in one word) in Turkic 
languages. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Kazakh and Uzbek share a common 
ancestor in Kipchak Turkic. It is written in the Cyrillic alphabet in Kazakhstan, but Kazakh 
language spoken in China  is written using the Arabic script. 
Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan hosts many different languages. In addition to 
Russian and Uzbek, Tajik has a large presence in the country, particularly in the cites of 
Samarkand and Bukhara. Other languages spoken the Central Asian nation include 
Karakalpak (which is spoken in its own autonomous republic), Arabic, a Jewish dialect of 
Tajik known as Bukharic, and Uyghur.6 
Uzbek is unique among Turkic languages. It is heavily Persianized (e.g. the days of 
the week are cognates from Farsi) in terms of grammar and lexicon. Persian also influences 
its pronunciation. As a result, standard Uzbek (Tashkent dialect) does not feature vowel 
harmony. However, there is dialectical variation and the closer one gets to Kazakhstan or 
Turkmenistan, vowel harmony begins to play a more prominent role in the spoken 
                                                 
“Kazakhstan: Special Report on Germans”, IRIN, February 1, 2005, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/28051/kazakhstan-special-report-on-ethnic-germans [Accessed April 24, 
2015]  
5 L Johanson, “Kazakh”, in Concise Encyclopedia of the Languages of the World, eds. Keith Brown, Sarah 
Ogilvie, 588. 
6 Uzbek, http://www.ethnologue.com/country/UZ/languages, [Accessed April 1, 2015]  
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language. Along with Uyghur, Uzbek is a member of the Karluk subgroup and is an 
amalgamation of Persian and Kipchak.7  
 Definition and Purpose of Language Policy 
 Language policy is a byproduct of language planning; it is a result of government 
authorities guiding the development, use and influence of a language. Tonkin writes that, 
“Language planning is often a byproduct, intended or unintended, of some other planning 
enterprise.”8 In the case of Soviet language planning, this statement was certainly true. 
Similar to the situation of border delimitation, language planning in the Soviet Union was 
conducted for the purpose of modernizing the people of the former Russian Empire. Lenin 
wrote in an editorial in Severnaya Pravda: 
The national programme of working-class democracy is: absolutely no privilege for 
any one nation or any one language; the solution of the problem of the political self-
determination of nations, that is, their separation as states by completely free, 
democratic methods; the promulgation of a law for the whole state by virtue of 
which any measure (Zemstvo, urban or communal, etc., etc.) introducing any 
privilege of any kind for one of the nations and militating against the equality of 
nations or the rights of a national minority, shall be declared illegal and ineffective, 
and any citizen of the state shall have the right to demand that such a measure be 
annulled as unconstitutional, and that those who attempt to put it into effect be 
punished.9 
 
The implication of this editorial is that no language shall have a superior position 
to another. The statement, “…introducing any privilege of any kind for one of the nations 
and militating against the equality of nations or the rights of a national minority, shall be 
                                                 
7 L Johanson, “Uzbek”, in Concise Encyclopedia of the Languages of the World, eds. Keith Brown, Sarah 
Ogilvie, 1147. 
8 Humphrey Tonkin, “Language Planning”, in Clinical Sociolinguistics, ed. Martin J. Ball, [Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2008], 120. 
9 VI Lenin, “Liberals and Democrats on the Language Questions,” Marxist Internet Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/sep/07.htm 
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declared illegal and ineffective.”, is a future indicator of how nationalities policy—and in 
turn language policy--would be shaped in the Soviet Union.  
As Fierman argues, the Bolsheviks believed that culture and language were 
inextricably linked. They believed that, through yazykovoe stroitel’stvo (language 
building), they could affect all areas of society.10 Of course, the Bolsheviks--especially in 
the early period--sought to affect all areas of life including marriage, gender norms and 
living space; however, the control of language would have enabled their control of political 
indoctrination.  
Without the control of language, the penetration of propaganda would not have 
been as successful. The control of language enabled the Bolsheviks to control language 
education. What follows in the next section is an analysis of Soviet language policy in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as well as modern language policy after 1991. 
 
Language Policy in the Uzbek SSR and Uzbekistan 
 The language policy of the early Bolshevik period (1924-1938) was a component 
of a larger project known as korenizatsiya, which is a derivative of the Russian adjective 
korennoy, of or related to a root. Korenizatsiya entailed the promotion of language and art 
forms related to it such as poetry and literature. Encouraging the growth of local languages 
such as Kazakh and Uzbek would, the Bolsheviks reasoned, ensure that local ethnicities 
would be able to take ownership of their own socialist revolutions. As Martin argues, 
                                                 
10 William Fierman, Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience, [New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 1991], 2.  
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korenizatsiya was a kind of affirmative action policy that ensured the cultural growth of 
nationalities in the Soviet Union.11 
 As Kirkwood writes (1990), the Soviets engaged in several steps for determining 
language policy. First, as mentioned in the previous chapter, they would send linguists out 
into the reaches of the former Russian Empire and determine what the titular language 
should be. The language with the largest population share would receive the status of titular 
language. Once this language was determined, linguists would codify the language. That 
is to say, they would standardize grammar and orthography. Second, Russian linguists 
living in Tashkent would standardize the language.12 Standardization of the language 
included deciding which dialect would be the form taught in schools and used in the media.  
Third, the Bolsheviks would modernize the language. The modernization of a 
language included not only the development of modern vocabulary for the purpose of 
technology and socialism, but also the social role played by a given language. For example, 
in modern Uzbekistan Persian was the administrative language of Samarkand, but Uzbek 
(at least in the early years) was designated as the language of government by Russians in 
Central Executive Committee of the Uzbek SSR.13 
In the case of Uzbekistan, ethnographers and linguists were part of the partitioning 
of the Turkestan Autonomous Oblast into the five SSRs. However, both the modern 
                                                 
11   Terry Martin, Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, 
[Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001], 13. 
12   Shirin Akiner, “Uzbekistan: Republic of Many Tongues”, in  Language Planning in the Soviet Union, 
[New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990], 104. These Russian linguists studied the Uzbek language, however, 
they only knew the dialect of Tashkent.  
13 Michael Kirkwood, “Language Planning: Some Methodological Preliminaries,” in Language Planning 
in the Soviet Union, [New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990], 2-3.  
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Republic of Uzbekistan and the Uzbek SSR are and were host to a sizeable population of 
Tajik speakers. In the 1926 All-Union census, those who identified themselves as Tajiks 
made up a little over twenty percent of the population. For reference, Uzbeks numbered 
3,475,340 and Russians 246,542, respectively. By the time of the delimitation of the 
Turkestan Autonomous SSR in 1924 from the Russian Federative SSR, 84.5 percent of 
Uzbeks lived in the Uzbek SSR.14 However, only 63.1 percent of the total Tajik population 
of the USSR lived in the Tajik ASSR of the Uzbek SSR by 1924, and as many of 35.8 
percent resided outside of that area within the republic.15    
The choice of dialect for the titular nationality of the Uzbek SSR was fraught with 
complications. More than any other Turkic language of Central Asia, Uzbek had a large 
diversity of dialects. However, it was the urban dialects of Uzbek—influenced by Persian 
and lacking vowel harmony—which eventually won the debate for the dominant dialects.16 
Opposition to the choice of urban dialects of Uzbek existed. Intellectuals such as 
the Jadidist Abdul Fitrat felt that the dialect of the urban areas was impure.  All Turkic 
languages should follow the “iron law” of vowel harmony. Ghazi Alim Yunusov, an Uzbek 
historian and philologist wrote: 
[Some of] our linguists do not know what kinds of dialects are spoken by Uzbeks. 
For example, they consider Chagatay, an impure Uzbek dialect, to be Uzbek. And 
                                                 
14 Vsesoyuznaya perepis’ naseleniya 1926 goda.M: Izdanie TsRU Soyuza SSR, 1928-29. Tom. 10-16. 
Tablitsa VI. Naselenie po polu, narodnosti, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_26.php?reg=2376 
[Accessed April 1, 2015] 
15 Shirin Akiner, “Uzbekistan: Republic of Many Tongues”, 103. 
16 William Fierman, Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience, [New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 1991], 91. 
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then they invented some sort of Sart language which they say is their particular 
language.17 
 
 Ironically, the descendant of Chagatai, modern Uzbek, would become the national 
language of the Uzbek SSR in 1924. The Persian-influenced dialect of modern Uzbek 
would become the national dialect because it was the tongue of the urban elites. However, 
Chagatai as a literary language was condemned by Soviet authorities. The writings of the 
famed poet Alishir Navo’i were counter to Soviet doctrine because of their religious 
content. Also, the claiming of Navo’i as a nationalist figure was condemned as bourgeois 
nationalism and a larger, Uzbek, separatist consciousness.18 
 Orthographic reform is another product of language policy that has serious political 
implications. The alteration (or creation) of an alphabet was an indicator of modernization 
in the Soviet Union.19 The modern Uzbek alphabet has gone through four modifications 
since the early twentieth century: Arabic, Latin, Cyrillic and Latin again in the early 
twenty-first century. Alphabets can be a reflection of the religious orientation of a society. 
Many non-Semitic languages, such as Pashto, Farsi, Uyghur and many languages spoken 
in Pakistan, are written in an adaptation of the Arabic script, and the speakers of these 
languages are primarily Muslim. 
                                                 
17 Quoted in William Fierman, Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience, 
[New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991]  
18 Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, [Stanford: 
Hoover Institute, 1990], 227. 
19   Ayca Ergun, “Politics of Romanization in Azerbaijan (1921-1992)”, in Journal of Royal Asiatic Society 
of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. XX no. 1, 33-48, 34. 
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 Twentieth-century reformers in Turkestan also believed that alphabets were a 
signifier of cultural orientation. However, instead of religion, alphabets were a symbol of 
modernity, or lack thereof. It was also a symbol anti-colonialism in the 1920s. As Martin 
writes: 
Among the national orientations that could be signaled by, or inferred from, one’s 
preference in alphabets were pan-Turkism, internationalism, Russophobia, 
allegiance to Western Europe, allegiance to the eastern colonial world, treasonous 
irredentism, loyalist irredentism, and Russian nationalism20 
 
 Like the modernizing reforms of the Turkish language under Ataturk, the 
Latinization of the Turkic languages in Turkestan was an attempt to purge the language 
(and society in general) of the influence of Islam. Islam was seen as an impediment to the 
advancement of a society towards the modernity required by socialism. As Fierman writes, 
“The adoption of the Latin alphabet for Uzbek and other Turkic languages of the USSR 
was the most tangible way in which the Bolsheviks attempted to undermine the Uzbek 
language’s tie with Islam in the 1920s.”21 
 Ergun argues that in the example of Azerbaijan, reformists who favored the 
Latinization of Turkic languages associated the Latin alphabet with modernity and progress 
towards a new age. The conservatives, who were skeptical of the reforms, favored the 
retention of the Arabic script because of their Islamic heritage.22 While this point refers to 
                                                 
20 Terry Martin, Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, 
[Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001], 184. 
21 William Fierman, Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience, [New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 1991], 74.  
22 Ayca Ergun, “Politics of Romanization in Azerbaijan (1921-1992)”, in Journal of Royal Asiatic Society 
of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. XX no. 1, 33-48, 35.  
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Azerbaijan specifically, it is still applicable to Uzbekistan for two reasons: both were 
Islamic societies and both used the Arabic script for Turkic languages. 
Modernization was not the only argument used to promote Latinization; practical 
considerations were also a key factor. Jadid intellectuals such as Fitrat believed that Arabic 
alphabet could not accurately represent the Uzbek language (or any Turkic language) due 
to vowel harmony. Since the Arabic script does not have letters that represent vowels, but 
only diacritics, the Latin alphabet would be more suitable. 
As mentioned previously, urban dialects of Uzbek lacked vowel harmony; it did, 
however, exist in rural dialects. When the Latin alphabet was adopted in 1927 it was the 
prevailing belief that these rural dialects represented a “purer” and more Turkic form of 
Uzbek.23 The urban dialects were not designated as the standard until 1930. One of the 
reasons for this choice was that the small number of ethnic Russians who had learned 
Uzbek would have a difficult time relearning the language based on a different 
pronunciation.24 
Another form of modernization in the Uzbek language was the adoption of a new 
lexicon for a socialist age. Many of these words came to Uzbek through Russian and were 
European cognates such as gazeta and respublika. Crisp writes that Arabic and Persian 
were strictly forbidden as sources of new lexicography because these languages 
                                                 
23 William Fierman, Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience, [New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 1991], 90.  
24 Mehmet Uzman, “Romanisation in Uzbekistan Past and Present”, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. XX no 1, 49-60,  
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represented Islam, and thus, they were obstacles to progress.25  The irony is that Uzbek, 
through its rich borrowing from Persian and Arabic, already had lexical equivalents such 
as ro’znoma and jumhirijat, respectively.26  
In fact, despite the promises of the promotion of titular languages, Russian became 
the primary source of new terminology, even if indigenous language equivalents already 
existed. Akiner writes, “In other cases [of new terminology] their use as replacements for 
‘outmoded’ Arabic-Persian terms was urged. The lexical balance of the language 
underwent a considerable change in 1920s and 1930s, with the proportion of Arabic-
Persian words falling by some 10 percent and Russian/international element rising 
correspondingly.”27 
The universalization of vocabulary was not the only step taken by the Bolsheviks 
towards the modernization of Soviet society. By the 1940s, Moscow began to realize that 
Russian needed to be taught in schools across the Soviet Union in order to unite the Soviet 
peoples. There needed to be a common cultural theme around which all Soviet peoples 
could gather. 
The motives behind this new introduction of Russian into the schools in Uzbekistan 
were twofold: First, by 1938 (the year of the introduction of wide-spread education in the 
Russian language) the Red Army needed a common language and, during the height of the 
                                                 
25  Simon Crisp, “Soviet Language Planning, 1917-1953”, in Language Planning in the Soviet Union, ed. 
Michael Kirkwood, [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990], 23-46, 34. 
26 Birgit N Schlyter, “New Language Laws in Uzbekistan”, in Language Problems and Language 
Planning, vol XXII no 2, 143-181, 167.  
27 Shirin Akiner, “Uzbekistan: Republic of Many Tongues”, in Language Planning in the Soviet Union, 
[New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990], 105. 
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Stalin’s reign, Russians were depicted as the pinnacle of Soviet civilization. Therefore, the 
common language of the Red Army was Russian. Second, economic co-operation 
throughout the USSR required a common language and, again, Russian was mandated.28 
The greater demand for the study of Russian in the Uzbek SSR also led to a move 
from the Latin alphabet to the Cyrillic alphabet. The reason for this was to ostensibly ease 
the study of the Russian language.  
However, the introduction of Cyrillic carried with it imperialist baggage. As Sabba 
argues, the Cyrillic alphabet was a way for Moscow to control discourse in Central Asia. 
The alphabet separated Central Asia from Turkey.29 That is to say that Cyrillic prevented 
the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia from communicating with their brethren in 
Istanbul, who have written in the Latin alphabet since the mid-1920s.  
 
Language Policy in Post-Independence Uzbekistan 
In October, 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR issued a language law. This 
law, hereinafter known as The Law on the State Language of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
(LSLRU) only made one mention of the Russian language. In the twelfth article it states: 
In the Republic of Uzbekistan, notarial acts will be carried out in the language of 
the state [Uzbek]. If a citizen so wishes, notarial acts can be issued by a notary 
public in the Russian language, or another language if possible.30 
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Fierman writes that this language law came into being under the influence of an 
increased sense of nationalism in Uzbekistan during the late 1980s. President Islom 
Karimov came into power as head of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1989 and 
began elevating the position of “Turkic” Uzbeks in favor of Persian-speaking Uzbeks.31 
Demographically, this law was a practical position for Karimov to take. In 1989, out of 
19.8 million individuals, those who self-identified as Uzbek made up 71 percent of the 
population, while Russians were 8.3 percent and Tajiks came in third at 4.7 percent.32 
There is an ethnic component to the promotion of Uzbek, especially in exclusion of 
Tajik. The Turkic component of Uzbek is given greater importance in the national narrative 
of Uzbekistan. The Institute of History of the Academy of Science of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan holds that Turkic peoples arrived in present-day Uzbekistan during the Bronze 
Age, and before any Iranian peoples migrated to the region.33 
As Schlyter writes, the previously mentioned law is considerably different from the 
version drafted in June of 1989. That version of the law gave a more prominent role to 
Russian and officially stated that it would be the language of inter-ethnic communication.34 
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The final version, which was released in October of that year, only mentioned Russian 
once.  
Currently, the Russian language has a secure position in Uzbekistan. According to 
Kellner-Heinkele and Landau, the Russian language retains its role in the workplace in 
Uzbekistan. Only 12 percent of the adult population reported only using Uzbek in the 
office, while 40 percent used both Russian and Uzbek. Additionally, 39 percent report 
using Russian only in the workplace.35 Further, Uzbek parents believe that their children 
would have a better future with a knowledge of Russian because of the high rate of labor 
migration to Russia and Kazakhstan from Uzbekistan.36 Though it is true that the English 
language is becoming a more attractive choice for study in Uzbekistan, the importance of 
the migrant labor economy will probably ensure the place of the Russian language for the 
near future. 
Ethnic Russians are not as secure in Uzbek society as their language is. Many 
Russians living in Uzbekistan do not feel that it is necessary to learn Uzbek. Only 22 
percent of the population claiming Russian ethnicity know the Uzbek language.37 These 
ethnic Russians may not see a need to learn the Uzbek language as the rate of the exclusive 
use of the Uzbek language in the workplace is relatively low.  
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 In 2005, Uzbekistan began to change from the Cyrillic to the Latin script. This 
move had been discussed since the emergence of Uzbekistan as an independent state.  In 
1991 a meeting was held in Ankara for the Turkic speaking peoples of the world. At this 
meeting a common Turkic Latin alphabet was proposed. The government of Uzbekistan 
approved this alphabet and decreed that it should be implemented in the 1994 school year 
and phased in nation-wide by September of 2000. However, by 1995, the deadline was 
extended to 2005. Additionally, the common Turkic script was abandoned in favor of the 
modern version.38  
 The reason for the abandonment of the Common Turkic Alphabet is that Uzbekistan 
wanted an alphabet that would be easiest to reproduce on a QWERTY keyboard during the 
age of the Internet.39  In her study of the latinization of the Tatar language, another Turkic 
language written in Cyrillic, Khasanova wrote, concerning language and the internet, “The 
transition to a Latin alphabet would make it possible for the Tatar language to enter that 
system and to become an international language, and Tatar-speakers would be able to use 
the Internet without having to change fonts.”40 
 This point is certainly true. The Uzbek alphabet does not require a unique layout 
and all letters can be reproduced without complex multi-key strokes; however, the 
                                                 
38 Mehmet Uzman, “Romanisation in Uzbekistan Past and Present”, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. XX no 1, 49-60, 57-58. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Gulnara Khasanova, “Language and sovereignty: The politics of switching to the Latin alphabet in 




transition to Latin was not without its critics. In 2007 a group of prominent Uzbek scholars 
lodged several complaints against the alphabet reform, some legitimate, some dubious.  
 One of the complaints was very fair and representative of the inefficiency of the 
modern Uzbek Latin alphabet. The digraphs ‘sh’ and ‘ch’ could possibly be confused 
because the letters which comprise the digraphs are composed are also independent letters 
on their own.41  Phonemes such as /ʃ/ and /ʧ/ were single letters in the Uzbek Cyrillic 
alphabet, thus requiring  less characters to compose the same words with Latin letters.42 
 Another complaint seemed more dubious. A group of scholars claimed that literacy 
rates would drop among adults because of the new alphabet.43 In fact, the opposite 
happened. According to the United Nations, in 2010 the literacy rate was 100 percent and 
99 percent among men and women, respectively. In 2012 the rate rose to 100 percent for 
both sexes.44  
 
Language Policy in Kazak SSR and Kazakhstan 
As in modern-day Uzbekistan, teams of Russian ethnographers were sent out into 
the Kazakh ASSR of Russia in order to ascertain which ethnic group dominated the area. 
According to the Census of 1926, out of 6.5 million residents, Kazakhs were the largest 
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ethnic group and exceeded 3.7 million individuals, while Russians were the second largest 
at 1.27 million.45 Thus, the titular language for the Kazakh SSR was designated as Kazakh.  
However, as in Uzbekistan, Kazakh only remained a language of the local 
population and did not become a means of communication for Communist Party cadres. 
Indeed, the first four General Secretaries the Kazakh ASSR/SSR were Europeans, and only 
four of them were Kazakh out of a total of fourteen.46 Therefore, Russian became an official 
language of the Kazakh ASSR (and eventually SSR) in practice throughout its history. 
Even though Russian was a minority language in Kazakhstan, it played a significant 
role in the Kazakh ASSR and SSR because of the history of migration of Russians into the 
Kazakh steppe during the mid- to late-nineteenth century. As Smagulova writes, 
immigration to this area occurred after the abolition of serfdom in 1860s. By 1889, 
Ukrainians and Russians began occupying the fertile lands and pushing nomadic Kazakhs 
out of the northern reaches of modern Kazakhstan. Additionally, the construction of the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad caused a further migration and by 1897 there were 540,000 
Russians and Ukrainians living in the area.47 
Unlike Uzbek, the Kazakh language did not have a great degree of dialectical 
variation. This fact may seem counter-intuitive because Kazakhs were a nomadic society, 
but the standardization of Kazakh was not fraught with controversy, as was the case with 
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Uzbek. Kirchner argues that the permanent mobility of the Kazakhs and their relative lack 
of permanent settlements (compared to other Turkic peoples such as Tatars and Uzbeks) 
led to a relatively homogenous dialectology.48 
However, when one considers the Kazakhs’ transient lifestyle, this lack of 
dialectical diversity makes sense. The Kazakhs did not experience the same level of contact 
with other peoples such as the Tajiks as the Uzbeks did. This is not to say that Kazakh does 
not have a diverse lexicon. Indeed, since the Kazakhs were Islamicized, there was (and still 
is) a large number of Perso-Arabic words in the language.49 However, this influence did 
not affect Kazakh in the same way that it did Uzbek. The Persian influence on Uzbek 
radically influenced the phonology of the urban dialects; however, Kazakh retains vowel 
harmony.  
As the issue of vowel harmony was closely connected with the script reforms, the 
first alphabet used in Kazakh was the Arabic alphabet. The first literary works in the 
Kazakh language were the written transcriptions of ancient oral epics such as Koblandy-
Batir. The first of these writings appeared in the 1870s.50 In fact, there was not a written 
version of the Kazakh language until the end of the nineteenth century, and the first 
alphabet for the written language was a variation of Arabic.51 A variation of this alphabet 
is still in use in Chinese Turkestan; however, the issue of vowel harmony is moot because 
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the Chinese authorities introduced actual vowel letters (and not diacritics) into the 
alphabet.52  
Allworth argues (in reference to Chagatai) that the printed Arabic script used in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was at best ambiguous concerning 
pronunciation of Turkic languages: 
At the time, the spoken Central Asian Turki language retained vestiges of the vowel 
harmony present in old Chagatay and Qipchaq Turkic. However, as pointed out 
above, the writing adapted to the language that writers used there around the mid-
1920s did not provide special letters to represent all pairs of vowels needed to 
represent vowel harmony.53  
 
Though this passage refers to older forms of a Turkic language spoken in Central 
Asia and not specifically Kazakh, it does pinpoint an issue that did have significant 
influence on the alphabet reforms of 1920s. Like Uzbek, Kazakh adopted the Latin alphabet 
at this time in order to modernize the Kazakh people and boost literacy rates quickly. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to investigate the issue of whether or not the Arabic or Latin 
script would be a better vehicle for raising the literacy of the Kazakh population; 
nevertheless, the intellectuals in Turkestan believed that Latin was a better alphabet for 
literacy because it provided a better representation of spoken Turkic languages in terms of 
vowel phonology. 54  
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 The Kazakh Latin alphabet was adopted in 1927 and survived as a mode of written 
communication until 1938. By 1939, 66,847 ethnic Kazakhs in the Kazakh SSR were 
employed in “white collar” professions--mostly in the pedagogical fields.55 According to 
the 1939 Census, there were 2.3 million Kazakhs living in the union republic.56 This figure 
means that 2.9 percent of Kazakhs were employed in these fields, while 39 percent of the 
total population of workers were Kazakh. The literacy rate was 7.1 percent in Kazakhstan 
in 1926.57 Though this study does not provide an exact number for the rise in the literacy 
rate between 1926 and 1939, we can conclude that the introduction of the Latin alphabet 
did coincide with a rapid rise in literacy because any employee of the pedagogical 
professions would be required to be literate. Once again, this conclusion is not an argument 
for the Latin script in favor of the Arabic script, but the introduction of the Latin script was 
a vehicle for the rise of literacy rates. 
 In terms of a lexicon, Kazakh was heavily influenced by Russian in the early years 
of the Soviet period. Like Uzbek, Kazakh adopted many words from Russian that related 
to Communist terminology, including neologisms, such as contractions like sovkhoz and 
kolkhoz. However, there was opposition to the importation of these Russian/international 
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words. At the First Congress of the Kazakh Language in 1924, the scholar Ahmet 
Baytrusinov proclaimed: 
In the absence of a native Kazakh word, we can borrow a word that is similar to 
one of the Kazakh language. This can be done according to the following rules: 1) 
A majority of the words are from a related language, though they can not have 
similar forms, but they have similar roots, and consequently, they are easier to 
understand and hear, and pronounce, unlike words from an unrelated language. 2) 
the Turkic peoples have and have had constant communication with each other, and 
because a majority of the words are from one language, without the presence of a 
common root, there may be a familiar representative of another language58 
  
 Thus, there was a pre-existing ideology in the Turkestan ASSR that promoted the 
incorporation of Turkic words into the lexicon of the Kazakh language. As Dosjan argues, 
the relative development of a language contributed to the number of loan words. The 
languages spoken in the Baltic countries—Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian—had a 
relatively well-developed lexicon in comparison to the Turkic language in terms of words 
used science and social issues.59 However, the Turkic languages—especially those without 
significant Persianizaion—had to import foreign words under Soviet influence.  
 
Language Policy in Post-Independence Kazakhstan 
 Like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan adopted a language law in 1989 that declared  Kazakh 
as the state language. However, unlike Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan recognized that the 
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population of Russians in the country was significant. Russian, therefore, would be the 
language of inter-ethnic communication.60 This was the politically logical step to take for 
the government of the Kazakh SSR. While Uzbeks made of 71 percent of the population 
of Uzbekistan, Kazakhs did not have the benefit of such as majority. While Kazakhs were 
the largest ethnic group at 39.69 percent of the population in 1989, Russians came in at 
38.7 percent. Aksholakova and Ismailova argue that Turkic-speaking minorities in 
Kazakhstan are reasonably fluent in Kazakh; however, if one were to add those to the 
population they would only make up 43.72 percent of the total population.61 
 As table 2.3 indicates, Kazakh is not a widely-spoken language outside of the 
Turkic-speaking communities. Though the Koreans have a relatively high rate of 
proficiency in the language compared to other non-Turkic ethnic groups, the tendency is 
for Russian to be the most widely-spoken language. This is likely due to the fact the 
presence of Germans and Koreans, for example, in Kazakhstan was precipitated by Soviet 
relocation practices. Those relocated to Kazakhstan already spoke Russian and they added 
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Nationality 
Proficiency in Own 
Language (%) 
Proficiency in Russian 
(%) 
Proficiency in Kazakh 
(%) 
Kazakh 99.4 75  
Russian 100  14.9 
Ukrainian 16.1 99.5 12.6 
Belarusian 13.5 99.4 9 
German 21.8 99.3 15.4 
Uzbek 97 59.2 80 
Tatar 37.1 96.9 63.6 
Uighur 81.3 76.1 80.5 
Korean 25.8 97.7 28.8 
  
Table 2.1: Proficiency in the state language (Kazakh) and in Russian among 
minorities in the 1999 census of Kazakhstan62  
 
The goal of the language legislation was to improve the position of Kazakh nation-
wide. Kazakh, by mandate, would be the language of government. However, this 
legislation was not an explicitly anti-Russian. As mentioned above, Russian would be the 
language of inter-cultural communication, meaning that it would be the medium through 
which the various peoples of Kazakhstan could communicate. As Article 3 of the Law on 
the Languages of the Kazakh SSR of 1989 states: 
The status of the Kazakh language as a state language and the status of the Russian 
language of intercultural communication will not be encroached upon, as well as 
the development of the language of national groups residing in the territory of the 
Kazakh SSR.63 
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Therefore, Russian will be protected and the rights of Russian speakers will not be 
violated. Proficiency in Kazakh is not required for most government positions, except for 
high officials such as the president and the leaders of the lower and upper chamber of the 
Kazakh parliament.64 Additionally, minority languages are protected and education in these 
language is encouraged where they are spoken. This provision for minority languages is 
enforced by Article 16 of Law on Languages of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 1997: 
In the Republic of Kazakhstan children will be provided with preschools which will 
teach the state language, but also the languages of the local residents.65 
 
 Using Aksholakova’s and Ismailova’s argument for linguistic distance in the 
relatively high proficiency of Uzbeks and Uighurs in the Kazakh language, it is easy to 
understand why these groups are able to speak both Kazakh and their respective mother 
tongues. But what of the Tatars? I would argue that it is possible that Tatar has less 
influence on Tatars in Kazakhstan because of the geographical distance of Tatarstan from 
Kazakhstan.   
 As for Koreans and Germans, the proficiency rate in their native languages is low 
as indicated in Table 2.3. However, there are public schools in Kazakhstan for these 
languages. There are a total of 126 of these schools which teach the minority languages. In 
addition, there are also 196 private for education in the minority languages.66  
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 In term of lexicon, Kazakh is moving towards “Kazakhization”, or the attempt of 
the authorities to replace Russian/international loan words with Kazakh/Turkic words. The 
State Terminology Commission was established in 1994 in order to create new Kazakh 
words for those imported from Russian/European languages. If it was not possible to create 
new words, they were altered in order to accommodate Kazakh phonology.67  
 There is evidence of a wider support for this purification of the Kazak language. 
Nurlan Orazalin, a Senator in the Congress of Republic Kazakhstan, stated in 2012 that: 
Somehow, international words are translated carelessly, contributing variations, 
which not only enrich, but also harm our lexicon. For example, the word 
“internationalism”. Never touch this word. Or how about the word “kompozitor”. 
The President uses this word. They say “kompozitor” all over the world. But there 
are good examples, we say “samolyot” [airplane]. We have a word for this in our 
language, ushaq. Here it is justified, but in the case of “kompozitor”, I think, it is 
not necessary.68 
 
 This statement follows the general logic of word adoption by the State Terminology 
Commission. While there may be word in Kazakh for “airplane”, it represents a relatively 
new technology. “Composer”, however, would probably be a pre-existing word 
considering the importance of national oral epics in Kazakh culture.  
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 Latinization of the Kazakh alphabet has been supported by the government and is 
seen as a way to move the country forward into the global market. Proponents argued, as 
they did in Uzbekistan, that Latinization would be appropriate for the age of the internet. 
Advisor to Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev, Ermukhamet Ertysbaev was quoted 
as saying: “In the era of globalization when Kazakhstan has intensified relations with other 
nations (…) shifting to the Latin alphabet is an acute issue”69 The secretary of the ruling party 
in Kazakhstan, Nur Otan, stated his support for the Latinization of the Kazakh language in 
Interfax Kazakhstan: 
Certainly, the transition of the Kazakh language to the Latin script will not only 
make it more popular, but also widen its limits. Now, when I go abroad, where the 
Kazakh diaspora reside, the process of exchanging materials is difficult, 
unfortunately.  Different scripts inhibit members of an ethnos from exchanging 
materials.70 
 
However, the Latinization campaign was not met with universal approval. It was 
considered costly and, counter to the arguments made by the officials quoted above, would 
divide Kazakhs abroad as the only alphabet they knew for Kazakh was Cyrillic. An open 
letter was written to Nazarbayev which was signed by many notable Kazakhs including the 
poet laureate of Kazakhstan, Muzafar Alimbaev. In this letter, it was argued that the 
transition to Latin would cut younger generations off from scholarship published during 
the Soviet period on the history of their country:  
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The first question is this. At present, nearly a million titles have been published in 
the Republic, scholarly works about the ancient and recent history of the people, 
their culture, spiritual worth and the respect of our spiritual foundations, literature 
and science. It is clear that, the transition to the Latin alphabet will separate our 
young generation from the history of our ancestors, spiritual thinking and prudence, 
which was composed in the Cyrillic alphabet. We already know from sources in 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, where they have already transitioned to Latin, that they 
are already regretting this because it has created many problems. For example, in 
Uzbekistan, where newspapers which used to have a circulation of 300, 200 or 100 
thousands, they have fallen to 5, 3 or 1 thousand copies a day. However, this is the 
age of the computer, but in order to move to the Latin alphabet there would need to 
be 20, even 10 percent increase in funds allocated to publishing.71  
 
The technological arguments for Latinization do not hold any weight. The Kazakh 
alphabet has significantly more vowels than the Uzbek alphabet due to vowel harmony. A 
Latinized keyboard would still require sixteen more letters than the QWERTY keyboard. 
Even if a user employed the Turkish keyboard, five more vowels would have to be added 
if the digraphs yu and ya are included. Additionally, the consonantal digraph –ng- is a 
major sound in Turkish, present in the possessive and many past-tense verbs. In Cyrillic, it 
is represented by a single letter. If the Turkish keyboard were used, it would require 
multiple keystrokes.  
 The criticism concerning generations being cut off from Soviet-era Kazakh 
literature does have some validity. The government schools could conceivably continue to 
educate the populace in two alphabets; however, then the transition to Latin would then 
serve no economic purpose.  
 
                                                 






          Both the Kazakh and Uzbek SSRs had similar experiences establishing their 
respective language policies. During the early period of the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks 
believed that national culture—including language—needed to be developed in order to 
move Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan towards modernity. After they reached modernity, they 
could be incorporated into a union of the Soviet peoples and throw off national identity and 
all the Soviet peoples would speak a single language and transcend nationality in all aspects 
of life. 
 The language policies set out by the Bolsheviks followed Kirkwood’s model in 
both SSRs. Ethnographic and demographic research was conducted in order to determine 
what the majority language would be. Lexical changes were initiated that would allow for 
both Uzbek and Kazakh to modernize their respective vocabularies in order to prepare for 
socialism. 
 Orthographic reform was also used as a political tool for the modernization of the 
language. The Arabic script used in both Uzbek and Kazakh was regarded as a sign of 
backwardness. In order to modernize the languages, a new alphabet had to be introduced. 
Since the Cyrillic script was a symbol of imperialism and Russian domination, the Latin 
script was the only choice because it represented a way forward in terms of culture and 
phonetics. 
 In 1991, language reforms in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan followed Kirkwood’s 
model. Demographics determined the approach taken to language policy and the use of the 
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Russian language. Russians in Uzbekistan were a significant minority population; 
however, they were not large enough for Karimov to be concerned with ethnic strife. The 
opposite circumstances occurred in Kazakhstan. The Russian-speaking population was 
large enough for the Russian language to be given a place of privilege, yet still allow for 
Kazakh to be the titular state language.  
 Finally, orthographic reforms in both countries are largely attempts to deal with a 
digital age and the Internet. Uzbekistan was successfully able to develop an alphabet that 
is completely adaptable to the QWERTY keyboard and uses letters which are present in 
most western European languages. This change was successful because the written Uzbek 
language does not include vowel harmony. Kazakh, however, does have vowel harmony, 
meaning that any Kazakh keyboard must have an additional sixteen letters. Also, because 
Kazakhstan is comparatively more open politically than Uzbekistan, the change to the Latin 




Chapter 3: Synchronicity of Foreign and Domestic Policies in 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Vis-à-vis Russia 
 
 
In this age of Russian attempts to reclaim eastern Ukraine, a casual observer could 
be forgiven for reaching alarmist conclusions concerning the former’s intention in the 
region. Further, this observer would not be out of place if he or she began speculating about 
a possible Russian invasion of the whole of the former Soviet space. Indeed, there have 
been recent cases of Vladimir Putin making references to Russian-speakers in other 
countries of the “Near Abroad” in need of Russian fraternal protection.  
In Russia, there are signs of Putin’s approval of policies that would draw support 
for Russia from Central Asians. ITAR-TASS reports that in April, 2014 the State (federal) 
Duma passed a bill that would accelerate approval citizenship applications for speakers of 
Russian in the former Soviet Union (FSU). This bill would give guest workers from 
countries such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Russian citizenship if they had a 
command of the Russian language and were born in the FSU.1  
These actions indicate that Putin does indeed desire to bring the Central Asian states 
back into the Russian sphere--that is to say, further into the sphere then they already are. 
However, the relationship between the FSU and Russia is complicated and, particularly in 
Central Asia, a single analysis cannot predict the polices of an entire region towards Russia. 
                                                 
1 ITAR-TASS, Sofed uprostil poluchnie grazhdansva RF dlya russkoyazychnykh sootechestvennikov, 
http://itar-tass.com/politika/1124730. April, 16 2014. [Accessed April 20, 2014] 
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This chapter will demonstrate how Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan diverge from each other in 
their approach towards Russia. Further, it will examine how domestic politics in both 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are used for political signaling which is aimed towards Russia.  
Finally, it present a theoretical framework that examines two Russian intellectuals 
and their views towards the FSU: Alexander Dugin and Dmitri Trenin. These individuals 
express divergent views regarding the former Soviet space. Dugin believes that Russia has 
a messianic mission to restore the world to a multipolar world where Russia leads a 
Eurasian civilization, which would counterbalance the United States. Trenin believes that 
Russia should orient herself towards the Europe and the United States. 
I believe that the views of Dugin and Trenin are relevant towards Uzbekistan’s and 
Kazakhstan’s policy towards Russia because these two intellectuals represent two 
approaches of Russia towards the FSU. This understanding is valuable because it gives us 
two sides of the story: How two Russians school of thought view Central Asia. 
Dugin is particularly important as a modern intellectual because of his influence on 
Vladimir Putin concerning his venture into what is now called Novorossiya. As  Anna 
Nemstova argues in the American current affairs magazine Foreign Policy, Dugin was the 
first intellectual to express an intellectual interest in reclaiming areas of Eastern Ukraine 
for “ethnic Russians”.2  
                                                 
2 Anna Nemtosva, “Who Will be the President of Novorossiya?”, Foreign Policy, April 29, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/29/who-will-be-the-president-of-novorossiya/, [Accessed December 7, 
2014]  
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Regrading Trenin, he has a large presence in the American press. For example, he 
has been consulted by news outlets such as NPR, Radio Free Europe, and the BBC.3 
Possibly, his expertise are sought by these organizations because of his position at the 
Carnegie Endowment in Moscow. That organization is well-regarded in the United States 
and it can be argued that, as an NGO, it is a source of American influence.   
Two Russian Intellectuals and the Former Soviet Union 
Alexander Dugin 
Alexander Dugin  holds a PhD in sociology and he is the chair of that department 
at Moscow State University. He has published over thirty books since 1996 and is currently 
the leader of the International Eurasianist Movement and a founder of the National 
Bolshevik Party.  
When the Soviet Union was crumbling, and soon after its fall, Dugin began writing 
for the right-wing4 newspapers Den’ and Zavtra. It was at this point that he began to read 
rightwing philosophers such as Julius Evola. Evola advocated a kind of “conservative 
revolution” which would take Europe back to a time before the Enlightenment, or even the 
predominance of Christianity. In fact, this was not to be return to a time when the Catholic 
Church held sway, but an even earlier era of a single Indo-European religion. For this 
                                                 
3 Jonathan Marcus, “Russia Sets its Sights on Middle East”, BBC, March 31, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32383365, [Accessed April 26, 2015]; NPR, Chemical Weapons 
Deal Loaded with Baggage, September 15, 2013, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=222701991, [Accessed April 26, 2015]; RFE/RL, 
For Putin, Ukraine is too Important to ‘Lose’, February 25, 2014, [Accessed April 26, 2015]  
4 Political orientations in Russia cannot be compared with the United States. A right-wing Russian 
politician does not share many political goals with his counterpart in the United States, except perhaps 
social conservatism. Some elements of the political right in Russia yearn for the day of the USSR and want 
to see Russia reassert herself in the world.  
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reason, Evola believed that Europe in the 1920s was going through what Hindus called the 
Kali Yuga; when the social order would be inverted and Untouchable caste would hold 
sway over the Brahmans. Evola believed that all religions could live in harmony in a pre-
modern world and it was this belief that has guided Dugin’s religious views.  
Dugin’s current preoccupation is Neo-Eurasianism: a political position which states 
that the current order of the world is unipolar with the United States in the position of 
leadership. Russia must lead a new civilization which shares common traits that includes 
the FSU (excepting the Baltic States), much of Asia, and the Middle East. This new 
civilization will create a multipolar world where America is not the hegemon. 
Dugin’s 1997 book, The Foundation of Geopolitics, is a 600-page tome that lays 
out his entire plan. Dugin believes, in accordance with the views of Halford Mackinder, 
that land-based empires are inherently opposed to sea-based empires. 
The Heartland appears as a key territory in a larger, common context—in the limits 
of the World Island. In the world island McKinder includes three continents—Asia, 
Europe and Africa. 
Thus, McKinder hierarchializes the global order through a system of concentrated 
zones. In the very center—“the geographic pivot of history” or “the pivot area”. 
This is the geopolitical idea of the geographical identity of Russia. This is what we 
call the heartland.5 
 
Dugin’s is arguing that geography determines destiny, i.e., Russia’s geographical 
location is its identity. MacKinder argued that because the space Russia occupies is flat, 
dominated by steppe, and lacks access to the sea, it has been invaded by “Asiatic” peoples 
over the centuries. This historical fact, McKinder writes, is why Russia’s land-based 
                                                 
5 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe Budushchee Rossii, [Moscow: Arktegeya], 1999. 
44. 
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empire is so different from Britain’s sea-based empire.6 Dugin uses MacKinder’s ideas to 
assert that Eurasia is culturally distinct and cannot endure a unipolar world dominated by 
the United States. However, his ideas about Russia’s unique cultural character are not new.  
Neo-Eurasianism is an intellectual movement which is a descendant of 
Eurasianism, a school of thought popular among the Russian emigrant community in 
Europe and the United States from 1920-1938. As a movement, Eurasianism was a reaction 
to the reforms of the 1905 Revolution. Glebov writes that the 1905 Revolution had, in the 
mind of the Eurasianist emigrants such as Trubestkoi and Savitskii, brought Russia closer 
to Europe culturally and politically. The literally and artistic “Silver Age” was a great 
perversion and it was corrupting for Russia.7     
While not agreeing with the Bolshevik doctrine, Eurasianists such as Trubetskoi 
argued that the Bolsheviks represented a messianic revolution in the world, and that they 
were a symbol of Russia’s own civilizing mission throughout the Eurasian landmass. The 
Eurasianists were strong believers in Orthodoxy and thought that it was a major component 
of Russian national identity; but they dismissed the state atheism of the Bolsheviks as an 
                                                 
6 Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, in The Geographical Journal, vol 23, no4. 
April 1904, 421-437. 
‘  
7  Serguei Glebov, “The Challenge of the Modern: Eurasianist Ideology and Movement, 1920-1929”, 
[dissertation, Department of History, Rutgers University, New Jersey], 38.  
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aberration. The civilizing mission of the Bolsheviks in the former imperial borderlands was 
a true representation of the sacred role of Russia.8 
On the surface, this position appears to be another form of European imperialism 
and an imposition of modernity on the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, 
Russia’s perception of itself in relation to its imperial holdings is more nuanced. As Tolz 
argues, orientalist scholars of late-nineteenth century imperial Russia perceived themselves 
as not only a European civilization whose mission was to modernize peoples of the steppe 
with the values of the Enlightenment. These scholars firmly believed that Russia was an 
“eastern” civilization that had a deeper understanding of the peoples of Turkestan.9 This is 
a civilizing mission, however, it is different from British and French colonialism in one 
important belief: Russian imperialism in the second half of the nineteenth century was 
influenced by Slavophiles and other intellectuals who believed that their Russian culture 
was better suited to the enlightenment of its subjects due to shared historical and cultural 
links.  
Historian Lev Gumilev expanded upon the idea of these cultural links, arguing that 
the forces of history are deterministic and that any attempt to influence them would be 
folly. History should not be studied from a political point of view. The study, for example, 
                                                 
8 Serguei Glebov, “The Challenge of the Modern: Eurasianist Ideology and Movement, 1920-1929”, 
[dissertation, Department of History, Rutgers University, New Jersey], 36-37. 
9   Vera Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late and Imperial 
and Early Soviet Period, [New York: Oxford University Press, 2011], 94. 
 
 55 
of the role of Peter the Great, according to Gumilev, is not an accurate way to analyze 
events in the course of Russian history; rather, it should be thought of as a movement of 
collective groups.10 
Thus, in this deterministic view, Russian history is the history of the interaction of 
Eastern Slavs and the peoples of the steppes and circumpolar regions. With this in mind, 
Gumilev believed that Russians shared greater cultural links with Turkic peoples than they 
did with the West. It is Gumilev upon whom Neo-Eurasinists such a Dugin draw to 
formulate their worldview. Indeed, in his influential book The Foundations of Geopolitics 
he wrote: 
Our movement [Neo-Eurasianism] will spread throughout all levels of life. 
In the religious sphere this signifies the constructive solidarity of a dialog of 
tradition for Russian confessions—Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism. There 
exists a common style of Eurasians spirituality, which, however, neither wounds 
the originality and dogmas of the religions with prejudice.11 
 
 This passage is devoted to the religious plurality of Eurasian civilization; however, 
illustrates how Dugin is, like Gumilev, acknowledge the multi-cultural nature of Russia 
and the Near Abroad. By listing the religions of Eurasia and asserting that they are equal, 
Dugin is arguing for a collective society not based on a single confession—which would 
signify Western arrogance and imperialism—but on a collective identity.  
                                                 
10   Marlene Maruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, [Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 2008], 70. 
11  Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe Budushchee Rossii [Moscow: Arktogeya, 
1997], 10. 
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Religious pluralism is an important feature of Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism. While 
Eurasianism under the auspices of Gumilev was still Orthodox-centric, Dugin’s new form 
of Eurasianism is inclusive because it did not include fringe elements such as ethnic 
Russian supremacism, which other right-wing political movements have to this day. It is 
relatively more respectable and had an element of support in the military command 
structure and among academics.12 In support of the religious pluralism Dugin wrote: 
“…the Orthodox Church and traditional (Shi’a, Hanafi, Sufi in one word—
Eurasian) Islam are full-fledged and genuine eastern traditions, while Protestantism 
and the Wahhabist heresy are parodies, substitutes, resulting from the apocalyptic 
distortion of pure spirituality”13 
 
On the surface, the conflation of Protestantism and Wahhabism may seem very 
strange. However, if one were to stop and consider Dugin’s core views, specifically those 
views concerning the European Union and the United States, this comparison becomes 
clear. In his book The Fourth Political Theory  he writes: 
The Islamic world itself, undoubtedly, united religiously with the constantly 
growing awareness of its own identity, in its turn is separated into a few ‘large 
spaces’: ‘the Arab world’, ‘the zone of continental Islam’ (Iran, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan)[…]And , nevertheless, Islam is precisely a civilization, more and more 
recognizing its peculiarity and its difference from other civilizations, and in the first 
place from liberal-Western civilization, which has been actively treading upon the 
Islamic world in the course of globalization.14 
 
                                                 
12   Anastasia Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy: Actors and Ideas, [Stuttgart: ibidem-
Verlag, 2005], 53. 
13 Alexander Dugin, “Tret’ya stolitsa Evrazii”, in Evraziiskaia ideia I sovremnost’ [Moscow: RUDN, 
2002] 237.  Cited in Anastasia Mitrofanova, The Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy: Actors and Ideas, 
[Stuttgart: ibide-Verlag, 2005], 53.  
14   Alexander Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory, [Moscow: Arktos, 2012], 118.  
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 By “treading upon the Islamic world” Dugin is describing American policy 
in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. By characterizing Wahhabism (the state 
version of Islam in Saudi Arabia) as a heresy, he is at once countering the American client 
states in the Middle East, and politically signaling Muslims throughout Eurasia that he is 
open to Islam being an integral part of his envisioned civilization. His mentioning of 
Sufism and Hanafi jurisprudence15 is an indication of his outreach in the former Soviet 
Union as these areas, particularly the Caucasus and Central Asia, which have a significant 
population of Sufis.  
Dugin believes this common civilization should be a brake against the incursion of 
the globalized world. He argues in The Fourth Political Theory: 
The logic of world liberalism and globalization pulls us into the abyss of 
postmodern dissolution and virtuality. Our youth already have one foot into it: the 
codes of liberal globalism and effectively introduced on an unconscious level—
through habits, commercials, glamour, technology, the media celebrities.16 
 
This “postmodernism” is corrupting for Russia and his future Neoeurasian 
civilization. Globalization erases the concept of independent civilizations and equalizes all 
societies through neo-liberal cultural relativism where all cultures are equal. However, 
Clowes argues that Dugin himself is a postmodernist. In her interpretation, Dugin rejects 
                                                 
15 Hanafi is a form of Islamic jurisprudence with is practiced throughout South and Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. “Hanafi Legal School”, Encyclopedia Of Islam, [New York: Facts on File, 2009], 286-287.   
16 Alexander Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory, [Moscow: Arktos, 2012], 118.  
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scientific and Enlightenment concepts of the West, arguing that universalism, secularism 
and rationalism would pervert his new society.17 
To translate Dugin to Central Asia, Kazakhstan is a better candidate for Dugin’s 
civilization when one examines his philosophy. Kazakhstan represents one important 
difference from Uzbekistan, which makes Kazakhstan more amiable to it:  it has a 
significant population of Russians. It has joined the Eurasian Union, which would 
encompass not only Kazakhstan, but Belarus and Russia as well. Laruelle argues that Dugin 
was able to seduce important officials in Nazarbayev’s administration, but only in respect 
to economic principals such as the Eurasian Union. Nazarbayev rejects the quasi-fascist 
pretenses of Dugin’s ideas. One should not assume that President Nazarbayev would want 
to subjugate his country entirely to Russia. He believes that Kazakhstan is a unique, multi-
national society, which should have close relations with Russia because of cultural ties, but 
not at the exclusion of the EU and United States.18 
As we shall see later, Uzbekistan has not capitulated to any part of this ideology, 
even in the economic sense. Uzbekistan conducts itself according to its own national 
interests. Pikalov argues that Uzbekistan is taking a multi-vector approach in which it does 
not subordinate its interests to either Moscow, or Washington.19 
 
                                                 
17 Edith W Clowes, Russia on the Edge: Imagined Geographies and the Post-Soviet Identity, [Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press: 2011], 52.  
18 Editorial, Astana Times, Ethnic Harmony and Multi-Vector Foreign Policy Key to Kazakhstan’s 
Stability, Development, April 22, 2014, http://www.astanatimes.com/2014/04/ethnic-harmony-multu-
vector-foreign-policy-key-kazakhstans-stability-development/, [Accessed December 7, 2014]  
19 Aleksandr Pikalov, “Uzbekistan between the great powers: a balancing act or a multi-vectorial 
approach”, in Central Asian Survey, Vol 33, no 3, 297-311: 305.  
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 Dmitri Trenin 
 Dmitri Tenin is the director of the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. He received his PhD from the Center for United States and Canada 
Studies at the Russian Academy of Science.20 He has published several books and articles, 
three of which I will discuss in this study, The End of Eurasia and Post-Imperium, and the 
article “Russia and Central Asia: Interests Policies Prospect”. 21 
 In her book, Heartlands of Eurasia, Anita Segupta classifies Trenin’s school of 
thought as Westernism. She argues Westernists believe that Russia is a European country 
and the only alternative is for that country to orient itself towards Europe. Russia must 
certainly engage with Asia for trade, just like any European country. It must also serve as 
beacon for Asian countries to reach democracy. However, to do this Russia must become 
European and move away from Eurasia as a civilizational concept.22 
 In The End of Eurasia Trenin asks if Russia is part of Europe or Eurasia. He argues 
that Russia must abandon pretenses of a larger concept of Eurasia and orient itself towards 
Europe. He only makes reference to Alexander Dugin in a footnote, but his views towards 
the theory of Eurasianism are dismissive.  Concerning Russia’s southern borders he writes: 
                                                 
20 Profile: Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=287&prog=zru. [Accessed 
November 26, 2014] 
21 Dmitri Tenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002; Dmitri Trenin, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011.  
22 Anita Segupta, Heartlands of Eurasia: The Geopolitics of Political Space, [Lexington Books: New 
York], 2009: 32-33.  
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After decades of conflict in the Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan have come to 
view Russia with deep, permanent suspicion, and Armenia looks to it largely as an 
outside protector...Many Russians, for their part, have developed phobias against 
all “Caucasians,” whom they regard as criminals, religious fanatics, or unwanted 
immigrants. Russia and the Central Asian states are becoming even more distant, 
and more peripheral in each others’ thinking. The one exception is Kazakhstan. 
Even in this case, however, few in either Russia or Kazakhstan imagine full-fledged 
integration. The presence of nearly 6 million ethnic Russians, mostly in Northern 
Kazakhstan, is a factor that warrants close bilateral relations, but it is also an irritant 
for the relationship.23 
 
 This statement suggests that Trenin believes that the Russian people do not have 
the political will to continue the imperial project. The presence of immigrants (and one 
might assume) labor migrants from Central Asia engendered xenophobia among ethnic 
Russians. However, Trenin does not argue that Russia would completely pull out of Central 
Asia and the rest of her southern tier.  
 He further acknowledges the continued influence of the Russian language in 
Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan. He also writes that Russia would be well served 
by continuing to influence the region through soft power, such as Russian music and film. 
However, Russia must be careful in this respect and not alienate Muslims by making 
obvious attempts at reestablishing empire in the region.24 
 Finally, he asserts that Russia should maintain military interests in the region in 
order to ensure stability. However, in line with his school of thought, he uses the example 
of Russian support for American troops in Central Asia as sign of Russia moving towards 
                                                 
23 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, [New 
York:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003]: 275.  
24   Ibid., 312. 
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Europe. By not opposing the stationing of troops in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
Russia was moving towards a more Western country.25 
The problem with this line of thinking is that Trenin is not taking the possibility of 
realpolitik into consideration. After the events of September 11, Russia was still dealing 
with Chechnya. Russia had been criticized for its actions there; however, after the terrorist 
attacks in New York City, the United States ceased calling Russia out on the issue because 
Washington saw Chechen Islamist radicals as part of a greater War on Terror.  
 Trenin’s arguments in The End of Eurasia are not without its critics. Andrei 
Tsyganov notes that Trenin goals are not practical. He writes, “Trenin’s vision of strategy, 
however, lacks a holistic perspective, and his recommendations to Russian politicians are 
mostly of an ad hoc nature with little systematic thinking behind them.”26 
 Trenin’s arguments, to this writer, appear overly optimistic and not in line with the 
reality. He seems to believe that the five Central Asian states will simply act as passive 
players in the interests of Russia and the United States, and does not believe that they can 
manage their own geopolitical interests without the help of Russia and the West. In essence, 
Russia should start on a “civilizing mission” along its southern borders, but not fall into 
the trap of Eurasianism.  
                                                 
25 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, [New 
York:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003], 194. 
26 Andrei B Tsyganov, “Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical Thinking in the Post-Soviet 
Break-up”, in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 36, 101-127: 114.  
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 “Russia and Central Asia: Interests Policies Prospect”27 is an article written by 
Trenin in 2007 from the  book Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing, 
which he co-edited along with Eugene Rumer and Huasheng Zhao. In this work, Trenin 
argues that Russia should not disengage itself from Central Asia. It has clear security 
interests in the region, and should dominate it in the form of soft power, not through neo-
imperialism.28 
 Trenin argues that Russia needs to ensure its own economic interests are protected 
and that instability along its southern border is quashed. Russia should also not concern 
itself with the authoritarian nature of the regimes in this region because the more serious 
threat is the alternative: Islamists in power in Tashkent.  Stability is the most important 
factor for Russia, not the rights of Central Asians.29 
 The Central Asian states have demonstrated their independence from Russia. 
Nazarbayev is an ally of Russia, but he opposes imperialism. Uzbekistan is very concerned 
with its status as an independent nation state and thwarts outside interference by both 
Russia and the United States. Once again, stability is the most important factor for Russia, 
not an expansion of Russian influence.30 
 In order to ensure that Russia maintains dominance, it should promote its own 
culture throughout the region through education exchange initiatives and outreach to elites. 
                                                 
27 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, Prospects,” in Central Asia: Views from 
Washington, Moscow, Beijing, [New York, ME Sharp, 2007], 75-136. 
28 Ibid., 79-81.  
29 Ibid., 84. 
30 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, Prospects,” in Central Asia: Views from 
Washington, Moscow, Beijing, [New York, ME Sharp, 2007], 88. 
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Russia should not seek to democratize Central Asia, but modernize the regimes and move 
them away from clan-based patrimonialism.31 
 Trenin’s most recent work, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story, was published in 
2011. The author obviously does not included the 2014 Events in Ukraine in this work; 
however, much has taken place between the date of the publication of this (2011) and the 
publication of his previous book, The End of Eurasia (2003).  With this in mind, Trenin is 
able to reflect on events between 2003 and 2011 (such as the 2008 Russo-Georgian Conflict 
and the Color Revolution in the FSU) and analyze how they fit into this over all argument 
about the “Westernizing” of Russian foreign policy.  
 Trenin also argues in this book for a collapse of public political will to recreate 
empire in the FSU. He writes, “For their part, the Russians have rather quickly adjusted to 
the emergence of new states in the former borderlands. Today, most of these former 
imperial Russian possessions engender scant public interest in the Russian Federation.”32  
 As a byword for the FSU, Trenin writes that Eurasia is an obsolete term. In this age 
of globalization such regionalization is irrelevant. The states of Central Asia have learned 
to live on their own, but Russia certainly keeps the region within its sphere of influence. 
Regional stability is the key interest of Russia, as well as the safety of Russians in the 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 129. 
32 Dmitri Trenin, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story, [Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace], 2011: 41.  
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region, especially in Kazakhstan. Trenin uses the lack of the support for the independence 
of Abkhazia as a sign of the independence of the region from Moscow.33 
  
Uzbekistan’s Relations with Russia 
 Uzbekistan’s relations with Russia since the fall of the FSU have vacillated. During 
the beginning of 1990s, Uzbekistan maintained strong ties with Russia. It joined the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the late 1990s Uzbekistan left the CIS and 
joined an alliance with Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM), whose 
acronym changed to GUUAM. It officially left this organization in 2005. 
 Signs of strong relations with Moscow were expressed through the CIS. Karimov 
forged strong ties with the government in Moscow, but as early as 1992 we can see a 
country trying to carve out its own independence. An example of such an attempt is the 
bilateral treaty, which permitted the CIS to station 100,000 troops on the territory of 
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Uzbekistan.34 These troops would come under the command of Uzbekistani military 
leaders, not a supreme commander, such as would have been the case in NATO.  
 The participation of Uzbekistan in the CIS is not simply for regional unity. Allison 
argues that Karimov and other leaders in the region do not join these regional organizations 
out of a desire for a collective Central Asia identity. They are not even motivated by the 
possibility of forging a national identity. Karimov and his fellow heads of state are 
motivated by using foreign policy as a tool for the maintenance of the domestic status 
quo.35  
 Regional organizations offer Uzbekistan an alternative to the OSCE. They protect 
Uzbekistan from criticism of its human rights violations. Uzbekistan stayed in the CIS 
temporarily because of the military protection it offered. The circumstances under which 
Uzbekistan joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO) are illuminating 
and provide an example of Uzbekistan not joining a regional organization in order to 
maintain the internal sovereignty of the regime. 
 The CTSO was founded in 2002 and its purpose is to serve as a regional, 
supranational military force. It evolved from the CIS as a means combatting the threat of 
terrorism in Central Asia. It was structured, however, in such a way that Russia would be 
                                                 
34 Hiro Dilip, Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran, [Gerald Duckworth Publishers, London]. 148. 
35 Roy Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures, and Regime Security in Central Asia”, in 
Central Asian Survey, vol 27, no2, 185-202:  
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the dominant player in the organization since it provided all the military hardware for all 
member states and gave these members a discount on this equipment.  
 Uzbekistan did not join this organization until 2006, after the United States 
criticized the Karimov regime for its actions in Andijon in the previous year. I believe that 
this is another indication of Tashkent’s unwillingness to join an international organization 
in order to keep threats to its legitimacy at bay. Once the United States had criticized 
Tashkent for the massacre in Andijon, Karimov ordered the American military out of 
Uzbekistan. Karimov, I believe, thought that by joining the CTSO he would avoid 
criticisms of his own domestic practices, but still have an ally in his own war against terror.  
 The most important political factor for Karimov is stability.  However, this stability 
is not for the state, but for the regime. In his writings, Karimov emphasizes the strength 
and importance of the Uzbek nation. However, he frames this nationalism in terms of 
security. In a passage of his book Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century 
he writes: 
The laying of the foundations of a “common home” for all Uzbek peoples and the 
emergence of a new poly-ethnic community have been the most important results 
of five years of independence. The universal character of Uzbek culture and revival 
of moral values and national self-consciousness have been the core of this 
community.36   
 
                                                 
36    Islom Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, [Curzon Press, Surrey], 
1997, 88. 
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In this passage, Karimov is clearly, yet subtly, outlining his vision of a new 
Uzbekistan. While appealing to the Uzbek people (though without defining who these 
Uzbek people might be), he also carefully acknowledges that the multi-ethnic character of 
his country; he tries to avoid alienating Tajiks, Russians and Bukharian Jews. This position 
serves to keep Uzbekistanis inline and not stir up conflicts. In the following passage, 
Karimov outlines his vision for a “proper” form of Islam in Uzbekistan: 
The revival of the spiritual-religious foundation of our society, the Islamic culture 
that contains the centuries-old experience of the moral consolidation of our people, 
is an important step on the path to self-identification and the restitution of historical 
memory and cultural-historical integrity…However, the process of the revival of 
the national traditions of Islam and culture has been a vindication of the decision 
not to “import” Islam from outside, not to politicize Islam and to Islamize our 
politics.37 
 
Karimov’s use of the term “import” is very telling. He undoubtedly is referring to 
the activities of Saudi Arabia in the Muslim-dominated parts of the FSU; that is to say, 
Saudi Arabia’s attempts to spread Wahhabism, that country’s official creed. It is perfectly 
understandable that a state should want to limit the spread of Wahhabism in its borders; 
especially in a state such as Uzbekistan, where Islam was tightly controlled and official 
imams are controlled by the state.  
Another method that Karimov uses to ensure the stability of his regime and combat 
Islamic radicalism is through agreements he was made with states such as China and third-
party companies. China’s relations with Uzbekistan are based on an entirely realist 
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foundation and the country has not criticized Karimov’s human rights record, as is the case 
with the United States. A November 2014 report by the NGO Privacy International outlined 
how China has assisted Uzbekistan in its electronic intelligence gathering.38  
China unquestionably is assisting Uzbekistan in this endeavor because of Uyghur 
separatists residing in Uzbekistan. Additionally, two Israeli private companies with ties to 
the United States, Nice Systems and Verint Israel, are providing equipment and 
infrastructure to Uzbekistan for electronic intelligence collection and analysis.39  
The SNB, Uzbekistan’s primary intelligence agency, is headed by Rustam 
Inoyatov. Inoyatov is considered by the State Department of the United States to be the 
main power broker in Uzbekistan and primary means of access to Karimov.40 Such an 
arrangement suggests that the regime in Tashkent is using outside private companies, as 
well as foreign governments, to combat Islamic radicalism in Uzbekistan.  
That said, Karimov uses control of religion in Uzbekistan for his own purposes, not 
the security and integrity of Uzbekistan as a secular state. A 2014 Human Rights Watch 
report has several examples of Karimov using his internal security force in order quash 
religious dissent. One example is Ruhhidin Fahridinov. Fahridinov’s father had been a 
prominent imam in Uzbekistan. The SNB charged him with religious extremism.  The 
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report states the Fahridinov was forced to sign an admission of guilt; however, despite this 
admission, all witnesses against him recanted.41  
Another example given in the report is Hayrullo Hamidov, a prominent sportscaster 
and religious figure in Uzbekistan. He was not an imam, but he offered religious advice on 
his radio show, criticizing the corruption of the government and his popularity threatened 
the regime in Tashkent. In 2010 the SNB arrested him and accused him of religious 
extremism.42 
 
 These examples are anecdotal, but they are indicative of a pattern. It is difficult to 
perceive any reason as to why these men would threaten the secularity of Uzbekistan. They 
are both Muslims and speaking from an Islamic perspective; however, they only offer 
criticism of the regime. They are not even associated with the Hizb-ut Tahrir organization. 
From a religious perspective, these are signs of an authoritarian regime that is only 
interested in its own integrity, not the integrity of a secular state in Uzbekistan. 
 Another example of Karimov using international relations in order to ensure his 
own stability is the precarious situation of his oldest daughter, Gulnora. In the past year, 
her position in Uzbekistani politics has changed significantly; however, according to a 
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United States diplomatic cable, since at least 2009 she was considered a contender for 
presidency once Islom Karimov passes away.43 
 However, this year signs of discontent with Gulnora Karimova have been 
circulating in the public, at least outside of Uzbekistan. In March 2014 the BBC received 
a letter written in Russian from Gulnora.44 In this letter, she detailed how she was being 
tortured under house arrest. She writes, “I am under severe psychological pressure, I have 
been beaten, you can count bruises on my arms.”45  
 In March 2015, the extent of Gulnara’s corruption was revealed in a report 
conducted by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. Since 2001, Gulnara 
had acquired nearly $1 billion in shares and payments in return for access to the 
telecommunications market in Uzbekistan.46  
 According to an analysis by Fergana News, there were three methods by which 
Gulnara and her associates enriched themselves. “Judging from financial documents, 
Karimova and her associates used three methods for their own, personal enrichment. First, 
a stake or false investment in the company. Second, the extortion of money which was used 
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for lobbying services.  Three, Uzbek regulatory officials blackmailed and threatened to 
arrest company officials and close their businesses.”47   
 The imprisonment of Gulnora Karimova is one way for Islom Karimov to improve 
the image of his country. In 2012 the Swedish government discovered that the 
telecommunications firm TeliaSonera paid Gulnora a bribe amounting to $300 million. 
The firm is now being investigated in Sweden under that country’s version of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act.  
 It can be argued that this scandal is damaging to the international reputation of 
Uzbekistan. While Uzbekistan is ranked by Freedom House along with North Korea and 
Turkmenistan in its Worst of the Worst poll48, the country still needs international 
investment. As mentioned above, Uzbekistan is not a country that only focuses its global 
political orientation towards Russia. It needs to maintain some semblance of openness in 
order to attract investing companies. Indeed, a United States diplomatic cable transmitted 
from Tashkent as early as 2008 argues that even businessmen from Uzbekistan were less 
than enthused about her. 
Despite speculation that over the years that President Karimov maybe be grooming 
Gulnora to succeed him, the decision to send Karimova to Geneva may reflect a 
desire to secure the family’s finance and enhance its prospects for future safety and 
security if conditions in Uzbekistan turn against the Karimov family, rather than to 
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provide her with another stepping stone in her political career. Karimova has given 
little indication of her long-term political plans, but the Karimov family has made 
many enemies; the fear and loathing that many alienated businessmen in 
Uzbekistan have for her suggest that her life in a post-Karimov Uzbekistan would 
be less than secure.49 
 
 Therefore, Karimov’s imprisonment of his own daughter was a cynical media ploy 
to clean up his country’s image in the world. Karimov was aware of the worldwide 
impression that his daughter was going to succeed him as president. Her past dalliances in 
the economy of Uzbekistan and status as a fashion designer and pop artist give the 
impression that Gulnora is not a serious person and fit to run the country.  
Kazakhstan’s Relations with Russia 
 In 1994 Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, gave a speech at 
Moscow State University.  In it, he outlined a new order for the FSU, a Eurasian Union 
(EAU). This EAU would be different from the Commonwealth of Independent States in 
that it would be based on supranational institutions such as a customs union and combined 
defense forces, similar to NATO. He addressed the importance of sovereignty and said: 
There is a need for the transition to a significantly new level of relations between 
our countries based on a new international unification, formed on the principles 
voluntarism and equality. Such a union can be established in the Eurasian Union. It 
must be built on other, that is to say different from the CIS, principles, because the 
basis of the union must consist of a supranational organs, which are tasked to 
decided two key problems: the formation of a single, economic space and defense 
force.  It is important to underline that all of the remaining questions, concerning 
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the interests of sovereignty, internal political issues, the foreign policy activities of 
each participant state, shall not be impinged upon.50 
 
Nazarbayev’s Eurasianist ideas are somewhat different from those of Dugin. While 
both Dugin and Nazarbayev do recognize that there is a difference between Eurasia and 
the West, Nazarbayev, being the pragmatic politician that he is, does not see these 
differences as a reason for inter-civilizational conflict. As Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan 
Erlan Idrissov stated in an interview with the Astana Times: 
Our foreign policy is not only active, but also multi-vectored – this is the most 
reasonable approach coded in the nomads’ blood and explained by our history and 
geography,” the foreign minister said. “Geopolitical tolerance is in our genes, and 
our entire history shows that that was a correct choice: by leaning towards one side 
we will ultimately infringe upon our own interests.51 
 
 Furthermore, Nazarbayev takes a position that can be best described as “middle of 
the way.” He confirms that there is a civilizational difference between Kazakhstan and 
Europe, but he does not believe that this difference should be a source of conflict. For 
Nazarbayev, pragmatism is of more importance. In 2012 he wrote an editorial in Izvestiya 
in which he stated: 
First, while there is no denying the meaning of cultural and civilizational factors, I 
offer to build a model  integration for all on the basis of economic pragmatism. 
Economic interests, and not abstract geopolitical ideas and slogans, are the main 
engines of the integration process. Because the fundamental principal of the future 
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of the Eurasian Union—a united economic open space  like a large-scale area of 
combined, successful growth of our people.52   
                             
 Nazarbayev recognizes that his country is a multi-civilizational state, which sits on 
the confluence of Europe and Asia, both geographically and culturally. He rebuked 
nationalists in the early days of the Republic of Kazakhstan when they were disgusted with 
his appointment of an ethnic Russian to a cabinet post. He commented to a biographer, “I 
had to decisively repulse such pseudo patriots…Time and again I reminded these 
Parliamentarians that the constitution we were devising had to unite the people, not divide 
them on the basis of their nationality.”53 
 Having established that Nazarbayev’s foreign policy is framed through his 
understanding of Kazakhstan’s civilizational orientation, I will now provide three 
illustrative examples of Kazakhstan vacillation towards and away from between Russia. 
These examples, demonstrate how Kazakhstan takes stands on world issues, which serve 
its own states interests and show that it is not entirely beholden to Russia, but does 
recognize its cultural ties with her. 
 As mentioned previously in this chapter, the CSTO was a tool for Moscow to ensure 
its influence in Central Asia continued. As Cooley writes, the CSTO was initially not only 
formulated as counter force to NATO expansion, but also as way for Russia to create an 
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environment of security dependency in the FSU.54 However, in recent years, the mission 
of the CTSO has changed. 
 After the 2010 election crisis in Kyrgyzstan, western analysts were puzzled as to 
why the CTSO did not deploy its forces to quell ethnic unrest in that country.55 The fact of 
the matter was that the CTSO’s rapid reaction force was only created for external threats, 
and not for any internal crisis within member states. Then-Russian president Medvedev 
argued that the mandate of the rapid reaction force needed to be expanded in order to 
include a peacekeeping force. Nazarbayev rejected this idea and only consented to aid for 
Kyrgyzstan in the form of policing equipment. 56 This move is significant because 
Kazakhstan is the second-largest supplier of troops for the rapid reaction force with four to 
five thousand soldiers compared to Russia’s 15,000 contribution of troops.57 
 This action taken by Kazakhstan at the CTSO meetings is symbolic of the county’s 
independence from Russia. Nazarbayev recognizes the importance of the CTSO as a 
guarantor of regional stability. Unlike Karimov, who joined the organization only in 2006 
after he was chastised by the United States, the president of Kazakhstan does not remove 
his own country from regional security organizations entirely in order to maintain stability. 
Nazarbayev makes use of a form of political signaling which demonstrates Kazakhstan’s 
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control over its own political destiny, but also acknowledges the reality of Russia’s role in 
the FSU. 
 Another demonstration of Nazarbayev’s political signaling is his movement of the 
capitol from Almaty to Astana. By moving the capital from Almaty to Astana, Nazarbayev 
was sending two separate signals. First, as Dave and Wolfel argue, relocating the functions 
of government to Astana (previously known as Aqmola) was a way for Nazarbayev to 
assert sovereignty in an area dominated by ethnic Russians.58 This move quelled any 
possibility of ethnic irredentism among Russians in the northern reaches of Kazakhstan.  
 Indeed, the idea of moving the capital was entirely the creation of Nazarbayev.59 
His English-language biographer, Aitken, writes, “The calming of ethnic tensions was high 
on Nazarbayev’s political agenda in the early 1990s. Encouraging migration of people from 
the densely populated south to the vast expanses of the agro-industrial north and centre of 
the country was also important for the young nation.”60 
 The relocation of the capitol was another  way for Nazarbayev to tell Moscow—
and the rest of the world—that Kazakhstan is a modern state possessing self-determination. 
As Schatz writes, colonial powers established regional capitals for the purpose of regional 
administration. In post-colonial states, moving the capital to a different location enables 
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the new regime to assert legitimacy; both in the eyes of citizens and the international 
community.61 
 Violations of religious freedom in Kazakhstan are not as egregious as they are in 
Uzbekistan. The 2014 International Religious Freedom Report states that Uzbekistan is a 
“country of particular concern” with respect to its violations of freedom of consciousness.62 
Having said that, the same report stated that religious rights in Kazakhstan are “continuing 
to deteriorate”.63 
 Of particular concern to the international community is the 2011 Law on Religious 
Activities and Religious Societies. Like in Uzbekistan, this law required all religious 
organizations to register and gain government recognition. A report by Freedom House and 
the Norwegian-Helsinki Committee finds that only Sunni mosques were approved for 
practicing Islam and that the Jehovah’s Witness Christian sect was barred from practicing 
in Kazakhstan.64 
 Article Four of the previously mentioned law mandates the competency of religious 
authorities. The competency of domestic religious authorities is ensured by the government 
agency known as the Ministry of Culture and Sports.65 This regulation of religion would 
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keep the spiritual nature of Kazakhstan within Nazarbayev’s own conception. Aitken 
writes, concerning the presidents view of religious tolerance in Kazakhstan: 
What may have changed in the early years of the 21st century is that Nazerbayev’s 
early laissez-faire approach to faith has mutated into an almost militant emphasis 
on religious tolerance. He has come round to this approach partly because he likes 
to proclaim a clear strategy for every aspect of life in Kazakhstan and partly because 
he discerns a potential long-term threat to his country’s political stability from 
fundamentalist Islam.66 
 
 By making sure that the official forms of Christianity and Islam (moderate Sunni 
Islam and Orthodoxy) are state-approved religions of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev is 
attempting to enforce tolerance and maintain the multi-cultural nature of Kazakhstan. In 
the very unlikely event that Islamist forces were to take power in Kazakhstan—particularly 
those associated with ISIL—it is quite possible that Kazakhstan would become an Islamic 
state, which would be only tolerant of a very narrow interpretation of Sunni Islam.  
 The maintenance of this religious tolerance, Nazarbayev argues, must be ensured 
through three approaches. First, religion needs to be supported by the state. Freedom of 
religion, according to the president, cannot exist where destabilizing fundamentalist forces 
are threatening Kazakhstan. Second, as a secular state, Kazakhstan must ensure that laws 
enforcing the supremacy of any religion do not get passed. Third, it is imperative for the 
state to counteract all forms of religious extremism.67 
 
Conclusion 
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 Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is independent from Russia. Trenin’s arguments, when 
applied to Uzbekistan, stand. Uzbekistan has, over the thirteen years since September, 11, 
vacillated between alignment with the United States and with Russia and favored one 
country over the other when it was in its own interest.  It has not shown any sympathy 
towards Dugin’s doctrine or views. The nation’s primary aim in foreign affairs is the 
maintenance of the Karimov regime.  
 Karimov’s decisions to not join the CTSO, is on the surface, nationalist, but there 
is another dimension. Joining the CTSO in 1999 would have limited Uzbekistan. The 
country would have been required to purchase Russian-made weapons and limited its 
dealing with international organizations outside of the FSU. In his 1998 (one year before 
the foundation of the CTSO) book, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First 
Century Karimov describes his vision for Uzbekistan’s integration into the world economy 
in five points: 
 
1. The supremacy of Uzbekistan’s interests within the overall consideration of mutual 
interests; 
2. Equity and mutual benefit, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; 
3. An openness to co-operation irrespective of ideological conceptions, and a commitment to 
universal values, peace and security; 
4. The primacy of the standards of international law with regard to domestic law; 
5. The promotion of external relations through both bilateral and multilateral agreements.68  
Karimov’s actions since this book was published follow these principals. He pulled 
out of the CIS and joined GUAM. When he speaks of “non-interference in the affairs of 
other states”69 he is, of course, speaking of his own, but his move to remove the American 
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troops from of the K2 airbase clearly demonstrate his low tolerance for interference. His 
turn towards Russia symbolized his “commitment to universal values, peace and 
security.”70 His application of “standards of international law with regards to domestic 
law”71 is, of course, haphazard and only done when it suits him, but I believe he means 
here that he is justifying his actions through the frame of national security, which he sees 
as a right of all nations, per international law. There are multiple examples in this study of 
Karimov promoting external relations “through both bilateral and multilateral agreements.” 
Dugin does not seem to enter Karimov’s thinking at all. His regime is authoritarian 
and clearly does not live up to neo-liberal standards of openness. For example, Internet 
access has been severely restricted by the closure of many internet cafes and through the 
issuance of new ordinances. Also, Uzbekistan now has its own version of Twitter, called 
Bamboo, which only works in Uzbekistan.72 However, these examples are not signs of 
Karimov moving towards the anti-Westernism and illiberalism of Dugin because he has 
always been there. These restrictions on the rights of the citizenry are simply a sign of an 
autocrat who wishes to clamp down on all opposition, not someone wishing to move 
towards a civilization under the tutelage of Russia. This is entirely in line with Trenin’s 
thinking, because Uzbekistan has exited the influence of Moscow and has become its own 
state. 
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Finally, Karimov’s persecution of his oldest daughter is an extreme example of 
going to any end to maintain his position. Gulnora did much to stain the reputation of 
Uzbekistan in the world. Her position as a representative in Geneva was merely a way to 
get her out of Tashkent and away from political influence. The TeliaSonera case in Sweden 
was the final act for Gulnora, but even before this case became known she was already 
alienating businessmen in Tashkent. Karimov could not obfuscate the details of the 
TeliaSonera case and it stained Uzbekistan’s reputation and kept international investment 
away.  
Under the ideology of Dugin, investment from the West would not have mattered. 
Karimov is concerned with his own and his country’s reputation. He only concerns himself 
with the influence of Western society insofar as it threatens his regime. Investment would 
not threaten his regime, and Karimov is perfectly willing to tolerate international business 
norms as long as they played into his own interests.  
By contrast, Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan follows a “pragmatic Eurasianism”. 
Aneschi argues that immediately after independence, Kazakhstan followed a policy of “(re-
)intregratsiia”. By demonstrating a firm support for Russian policies in order to avoid 
ethnic conflict, Nazarbayev built a narrative of national character.73 
While acknowledging the multi-ethnic character of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has 
asserted the country’s independence. By arguing against a peacekeeping mandate for the 
rapid reaction force of CTSO, the president showed that Kazakhstan is not completely 
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subservient to Russia. This is not out of line with Dugin’s thinking. In his essay “Putin and 
Nazarbayev Building Eurasian Positions” he wrote: 
Putin and Nazarbayev, in a sense, are in the same situation: they are democratic 
rulers who are  popular in their respective countries, and who are protecting the 
stability of their own countries, as well as the convergence between the states of 
the post-Soviet space.74 
 
 Another demonstration Kazakhstan’s independence is the building of Astana and 
its designation as the national capital. Once again, Kazakhstan was demonstrating its 
independence from Russia and asserting sovereignty in a region dominated by ethnic 
Russians. However, this was not Kazakhstan thumbing its nose at Russia in the same way 
that Uzbekistan did when it did not join the CTSO.  
 As Schatz argues, the development of Astana was more of way for Nazarbayev to 
assert his position as an authoritarian president. It is easier for authoritarian governments 
to relocate the seat of government because of the enormous costs involved in doing so.75 
Nazarbayev’s decision to relocate was simply an assertion of control and way for him to 
demonstrate his strength as a president. 
 Finally, Nazarbayev’s measures for controlling religion in Kazakhstan are in some 
ways similar to Karimov’s. Both Nazarbayev and Karimov control the doctrine of religion 
through government institutions. They also believe that control of religion ensures the 
                                                 
74 Alexander Dugin, “Putin I Nazarbayev Stoyat na Evraziiskikh Pozitsiyakh”, in Evraziiskaya Missiya 
Nursultana Nazarbayeva, ed. Alexander Dugin, [Moscow: Arktos, 2004], 36. 
75  Edward Schatz, When Capital Cities Move: The Political Geography and Nation and State Building, 
[Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute of International Studies, 2003], 9. 
https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/303.pdf [Accessed March 28, 2015]  
 
 83 
stability of their respective states and regimes. Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan regulate 
religion in order to maintain their own ideals of their respective  regimes. The difference 
between Karimov’s and Nazarbayev’s approach towards religion is that Nazarbayev 
frames his approach in terms of his relation with Russia and Kazakhstan’s status as a multi-
ethnic state. 
 This approach to religion is consistent with Dugin’s views. Dugin believes that 
Islam and Christianity can coexist in his Eurasian civilization. Such a view is a result of 
the idea that land-based empire such as the USSR and his Eurasian civilization are not 
receptive to new ideas that are introduced by sea-based empires. Therefore, modern 






Labor Migration from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia 
 
 As discussed in chapter two, the diverging demographic profiles of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan influence local politics. Like language policy, Nazarbayev’s and Karimov’s 
respective attitudes towards Russia are also reflected in their views towards their subjects’ 
annual labor migration to Russia.  
 This chapter examines Karimov’s and Nazarbayev’s respective views towards 
labor migration from their countries, as well as the resulting economic realities, that is, 
what sort of impact labor migration policy has on the economies of Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. Using demographic date concerning migration from Rosstat (the Russian 
national statistics agency), the World Bank, and other agencies, I will not only give a 
breakdown of labor statistics in Russia, but also how much they contribute to their countries 
in terms of remittances.  
 As the statistical data in this study is from official, government sources, one should 
remember that the numbers rely on self-reporting by migrant laborers. The purpose of this 
chapter is not to give an exact numerical picture of the number of migrants from Uzbek 
and Kazakhstan, but rather to provide a proportional representation. These data—
especially the migration data---should be interpreted as representative of larger picture of 
proportion of Kazakhs to Uzbeks, rather than an exact number. 
 There is a stark difference between the respective labor migration patterns of 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Indeed, as I shall show later in this chapter, Kazakhstan is 
actually a destination for Uzbek workers and the number of Kazakh workers relative to 
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their Uzbek counterparts making the journey to Russia is low. However, I shall show how 
Karimov and Nazarbayev approach the issue of the issue of emigration from their countries 
for the purposes of work. 
 This chapter is organized thematically, with an account of the local economy of 
both countries, followed a statistical profile of migration trends to Russia. Finally, an 
overview of public attitudes towards labor migration from both Karimov and Nazarbayev 
in the form of public statements is presented. First, a brief overview of labor migration in 
Russia will provide context for the remainder of the discussion. 
 
Labor Migration in Russia 
 In 1989, Russia’s population was at its highest point since the first All-Union 
census was taken in 1926. As Table 4.1 illustrates, the Russian Federation had a total 
population 100.8 million individuals. After the devastating losses of the Great Patriotic 
War, Russia witnessed a “baby boom” and the population rose by 17.5 million by the time 
of the Census of 1959. As the USSR was heading for collapse, the country saw its highest 
population figures hover around 147.4 million in 1989. However, by 2002, Russia’s 
population dropped by 2.23 million and suffered another loss of 2.3 million by 2010. 
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Table 4.1 Population of Russia from 1926 to 20101 
 
 Similarly, the fertility rate in Russia also declined during this time span. As Table 
4.2 shows, in 1961 Russia had a fertility rate of 2.417, which is above the ideal replacement 
rate of 2.12 However, Russia dropped below that optimal rate within five years. Between 
1966 and 1967 it went down to 2.072. The rate fell to its lowest between 1979 and 1980 
when it hit 1.888. In 1987, the rate climbed to 2.194, but fell to an alarming 1.23 in the 
next ten years. In the 2000s the rate fluctuated between 1.214 and 1.576, and as of 2013, it 
remains at 1.707.  
  
                                                 
1 Demoskop, Vsesoyuznaya perepis’ naseleniya, 1926, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989; Vserossiiskaya 
perepis’ naseleniya, 2002, 2010, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/census.php?cy=1 [Accessed April 1, 
2015]  
2 Joseph Chamie, Barry Merkin, “Russian Demographics: The Perfect Storm”, Yale Global Online, 
December 11, 2014, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/russian-demographics-perfect-storm [Accessed 
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Table 4.2 Total Fertility Rates for Russia3 
 
 The economic uncertainties of the 1990s forced Russian citizens to reconsider 
having children.4 However, this population decline has affected the Russian economy. Any 
children born between 1990 and 1997 are now of working age, but the population crisis 
has led to a dearth of workers, especially in low-skilled jobs. 
 For example, Shcherbakova found that in 2011 to 2012 the foreign labor migrants 
predominated in the construction trades and unskilled labor. In 2011 21.6 percent of these 
labor migrants worked in construction, and 29.1 in unskilled trades. For 2012, the statistics 
for these industries are 25 percent and 31 percent, respectively.5 
                                                 
3 Demograficheskiy Ezhegodnik Rossiii, 2014. http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B14_16/Main.htm [Accessed 
April 15, 2015]  
4 Joseph Chamie, Barry Merkin, “Russian Demographics: The Perfect Storm”, Yale Global Online, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/russian-demographics-perfect-storm [Accessed April 15, 2015] 
5 Ekaterina Shcherbakova, “Na konets 2012 goda razreshenie na rabotu v Rossii imeli 1149 tysyach 
inostannykh grazhdan”, Demoskop Weekly, no 545-546, March 2013, 





























































































































































  In terms of numbers, the difference between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is 
significant. If measured by number of work permits issued through Rostrud—the federal 
labor ministry--citizens of Uzbekistan were issued 399 thousand and 468 thousand permits 
in 2011 (38%)  and 2012 (40.7%), respectively. By contrast, citizens of Kazakhstan had a 
much lower rate of labor migration to Russia. In 2011 Kazakhstanis received 4,500 (0.4%) 
of these documents, and 800 (0.1%) in 2012. 6 
  
 
Table 4.3 Remittances Sent From Russia to Countries of the FSU (Millions USD)7 
 
                                                 
 
6 Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstennoy Statistiki, “Chislennost’ Inostrannykh Grazhdan, Imevshikh 
Deystvuyushchee Razreshenie na Rabotu”, Trud i Zanyatost’ v Rossii 2013 god, 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b13_36/Main.htm, [Accessed April 1, 2015]  
 
7  Tsentral’nyi Bank Rossiiskoy Federatsii, Transgranichnye Perevody, Osushchestvlennye Cherez Sistemy 










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 89 
 Table 4.3 shows that, in terms of remittances, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are the 
largest recipients of money sent from Russia compared to the rest of the FSU, according to 
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.  Like the situation with work permits, 
Uzbekistan far outstrips Kazakhstan in terms of money sent home by migrant workers. 
Later in this chapter, I will discuss how these remittances affect the local GDPs of 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
 
Labor Migration from Uzbekistan to Russia 
 Labor migration from Uzbekistan is influenced by lack of opportunity in the 
country. Ilkhamov gives two reasons as to why this problem emerged in the post-Soviet 
period. First, Uzbeks had a greater freedom of movement. This freedom allowed them to 
seek financial resources elsewhere. Second, living standards immediately declined in 
Uzbekistan in the early 1990s.8 
 The reasons that Uzbeks choose to travel to Russia are three fold: First, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, proficiency in the Russian language is still high enough 
in Uzbekistan that there are no barriers for communication. Second, the visa regime 
between Uzbekistan and Russia is uncomplicated. Uzbeks do not need to go through the 
onerous task of obtaining a ninety-day Russia visa in order to travel there. Third, the wage 
gap is quite wide between Russia and Uzbekistan.9  
                                                 
8 Alisher Ikhamov, Geographic Mobility of Uzbeks: The Emergence of Cross-Cultural Communities vs. 
Nation-State Control, http://www.nbr.org/Downloads/pdfs/PSA/Uzk_Conf06_Ilkhamov.pdf 
9 Ibid. 
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 Between the years 2000 and 2013 the differences between wages in Uzbekistan and 
Russia were considerable. According to data from the World Bank, the average difference 
between wages in Russia and Uzbekistan was 788%.10 In the year 2008, the average wage 
in Uzbekistan was $960, while the average in Russia was $9640. In terms of absolute 
growth of wages, Russia witnessed an average increase of 31% in the time period, whereas 
Uzbekistan’s growth was only 13%.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Comparison of growth of wages between Russia and Uzbekistan USD.11 
 
 The rate of labor migration from Uzbekistan to Russia is very difficult to estimate. 
Official figures put the number of Uzbek workers well below the estimates of experts in 
the field of labor migration in the FSU. For example, Rosstat stated in a 2011 report that in 
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2005 there were 49,000 workers from Uzbekistan, a mere 7 percent of the migrant labor 
market for that year.12 However, Maksakova argues that the actual number is 400 to 450 
thousand individuals from that country.13 Ioffe and Zanyonchkovskaya argue that this 
discrepancy is due to hiring practices. Employers are reluctant to formalize the employment 
of migrant laborers.14 It is quite possible that the reason for this is that employers are 
reluctant to do this because of the increased paperwork and necessary minimum working 
conditions.  
 The impact of remittances on the economy of Uzbekistan is significant. As Table 
4.5 shows, Uzbeks in Russia not only send the largest share of remittances home, but  out 
of the five Central Asian states, Uzbekistan’s GDP is more closely intertwined with these 
funds than any other country in the region. As I will discuss below, Kazakhstan’s share is 
low because its economy is stronger and it sends fewer migrants. Turkmenistan’s GDP is 





                                                 
12 Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstennoy Statistiki, “Chislennost’ Inostrannykh Grazhdan, 
Osushchestvlyavshikh Trudovuyu Deyatel’nost’ v Rossii”, Turd I Zanyatost’  v Rossii 2011 g, 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B11_36/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/05-14.htm [Accessed April 16, 2015] 
 
13 Lyudmila Maksakova, “Uzbekistan v Sisteme Mezhdunarodnykh Migratsii”, Demoskop Weekly, March 
22, 2010, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2010/0415/analit03.php, [Accessed April 16, 2015]  
14 Grigory Ioffe; Zhanna Zanyonchkovskaya, “Immigration to Russia: Inevitability and Prospective 







 Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan 
2007 1666 (8) 1632 (4) 715 (2) 124 (< .01) 29 (<.01) 
2008 2978 (11) 2516 (3) 1157 (2) 187 (<.01) 48 (<.01) 
2009 2052 (6) 1724 (3) 894 (2) 160 (<.01) 35 (<.01) 
2010 2845 (7) 2216 (3) 1106 (2) 247 (<.01) 35 (<.01) 
2011 4262 (9) 3015 (4) 1547 (2) 363 (<.01) 34 (<.01) 
2012 5668 (11) 3634 (4) 1837 (3) 391 (<.01) 37 (<.01) 
2013 5533 (9) 4155 (4) 2080 (3) 455 (<.01) 40 (<.01) 
 








                                                 
15 Tsentral’nyi Bank Rossiiskoy Federatsii, Transgranichnye Perevody, Osushchestvlennye Cherez Sistemy 
Denezhnykh Perevodov po Osnovynym Stranam-Kontragentam za 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 




























2000 212,472 40,810 6,100 15% 
2005 24,6386 30,436 49,000 160% 
2006 209,227 37,126 105,100 283% 
2007 214,310 52,812 344,600 652% 
2008 195,836 43,518 642,700 1,476% 
2009 187,710 42,539 666,300 1,566% 
2010 183,858 24,100 511,500 2,122% 
2011 184,149 64,493 399,000 618% 
2012 210,653 87,902 467,900 532% 
 
 
Table 4.6 Emigration from Uzbekistan to Russia16 
 
                                                 
16 O’zbekiston Respublikasi Statistika Davlat Qo’mitasi, “Doimiy aholi soni”, Demographik 
Korsa’tkichlar, http://www.stat.uz/index.php/interaktiv/demograficheskie-dannye [Accessed April 17, 
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Table 4.6 presents a break-down of migration patterns from Uzbekistan. As 
columns three and four show, there is a significant discrepancy between the number of 
immigrants and workers. Work permits are issued only for 90 days. After this period, a 
migrant laborer must obtain medical clearance for HIV, TB, drug use and other conditions. 
However, the procedure for medical testing is very onerous and the workers stay in Russia 
illegally or go to neighboring countries and return.17 
 “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens”--a law introduced in 2007--attempted to 
alleviate pressure on foreign migrants in respect to registration for work. Previously, 
migrants registered through a prospective employer. After 2007, it was the responsibility 
of the migrants to register for work permits.18  
 Zayonchkovskaya writes that this law led to a 20 percent rise in workers registering 
for work legally; however, Uzbeks were still prone to working illegally. She shows that 75 
percent of Uzbeks were registered, and the remaining were undocumented after the 2007 
law was passed.19 However, even using a working subset of Uzbeks who immigrated 
legally (i.e. registered with city authorities within three days of arrival) the numbers from 
Table 4.6 still indicate that Uzbek migrant laborers overwhelmingly do not use legal 
channels for seeking employment. 
                                                 
2015]; Fedrel’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoy Statistiki, Demographicheskii Ezhegodnik 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_113767420
931 [Accessed April 17, 2014] 
17 Human Rights Watch, “Are you Happy to Cheat Us?”: Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in 
Russia, February 2009,  26.;  
18 Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, “Novaya Migratsionnaya Politika: Pervye Itogi”, in Polit.ru, March 18, 2009, 
http://polit.ru/article/2009/03/18/demoscope367/ [Accessed March 30, 2015]  
19 Ibid. 
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 As a share of the labor migrant population, Uzbeks occupy the largest subset 
compared to any nationality of the FSU. Table 4.7 shows that, even by official numbers, 
Uzbeks were 38.8 percent of this population in 2011, and 40 percent 2012. Human Rights 
Watch puts the number of Uzbek workers in Russia as high as 3.8 million in 2009, and the 
World Bank claims that the number was 1.1 million in 2013.20  
 
 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Uzbekistan 2.9% 7% 10.4% 20.1% 26.5% 30% 31.2 38.8% 40.7% 
Kazakhstan 1.4% 0.6% 0.5% 7.6% 10.4% 11.2% 8.3% 0.4% 0.1% 
Turkmen. 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
Tajikistan 2.9% 7.5% 9.7% 14.6% 16.1% 16.2% 16.4% 16.2% 15.8% 
Kyrgyzstan 0.4% 2.3% 3.3% 6.4% 7.6% 7% 7.2% 6.4% 6.7% 
Ukraine 30.1% 20.2% 16.9% 12.2% 10.1% 9.2% 10.2% 10.7% 11.1% 
Moldova 5.6% 4.4% 5.0% 5.5% 5.0% 4.4% 4.6% 4.6% 4.4% 
 
4.7 Share of Migrant Labor Population by Country21 
 
Taken together, the above statistics indicate wages in Uzbekistan are such that 
Russia is a powerful attraction for any Uzbek wishing to help his family financially. As 
                                                 
20 Human Rights Watch, Are you Happy to Cheat Us?”: Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in 
Russia, February 2009,; World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data, 2013. 
21 Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstennoy Statistiki, “Chislennost’ Inostrannykh Grazhdan, 
Osushchestvlyavshikh Trudovuyu Deyatel’nost’ v Rossii”, Turd I Zanyatost’  v Rossii 2011 g, 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B11_36/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/05-14.htm [Accessed April 16, 2015] 
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previously shown in Table 4.4, the earning power of migrant laborer in Russia can be 
significant. Human Rights Watch reports that 23 to 25 percent of the population lives in 
poverty.22 
Remittances are a significant portion of the GDP of Uzbekistan. One could attribute 
the amount of remittances to the fact that is the most populous country in Central Asia; 
however, with a population of 17 million in Kazakhstan versus 29 million in Uzbekistan23, 
there are only 1.7 times more people in Uzbekistan than Kazakhstan. Therefore, the smaller 
contribution of Kazakh migrant laborers to the economy of Kazakhstan is a function of the 
county’s economy, rather than having a smaller population than Uzbekistan. 
 
Karimov’s View of Migrant Laborers 
The question remains as to how the presence of Uzbek workers in Russia affect the 
Karimov government. In June 2013 Karimov proclaimed, “There are very few lazy people 
in Uzbekistan now,--" […] "I describe as lazy those who go to Moscow and sweep its streets 
and squares. One feels disgusted with Uzbeks going there for a slice of bread."24 
Further, Karimov believes that labor migration is a national humiliation for Uzbekistan. 
Eurasianet reports that he said, “The Uzbek nation’s honor makes us different from others. Is 
                                                 
22 Human Rights Watch, “Are you Happy to Cheat Us?”: Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in 
Russia, February 2009, 106. 
23 World Bank 
24 RFE/RL, Karimov: Uzbek Migrants and ‘Lazy’, Beggars don’t Exist’, June 23, 2013, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-karimov-beggars-migrants-remittances/25028531.html [Accessed 
April 18, 2015]  
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not it better to die [than scrounge]? Therefore, I call lazy those [who] disgrace all of us by 
wanting to make a lot of money faster there,”25 
Thus, Karimov believed at that time that only lazy Uzbeks go to work in Russia and 
that is why there are no beggars in streets of Tashkent. The editor of the Jarayon website argued 
that, while migrant labor was not secret in Uzbekistan, the government all but ignored it until 
there was report of an attack on an Uzbek immigrant in Moscow by Russian nationalists.26 
Given Karimov’s proclivity for making the stability of Uzbekistan his utmost priority, 
it is possible that Karimov was using this occasion as a way to denigrate those Uzbeks who go 
abroad temporarily. In Russia, Uzbeks have a wider access to information, which is not 
available in Uzbekistan. Returning citizens could be security risks in the eyes of the 
government.27 
As I argued in chapter three, security is a major priority for the Karimov 
government. The stability of the regime and the state is a motiving factor in both Karimov’s 
domestic and foreign policies. Access to information is—for Karimov—destabilizing.  
One way in which Karimov attempts to ensure stability is to control who can leave 
Uzbekistan. With the discriminate issuance of exit visas, Karimov can exercise control over 
Uzbeks wanting to go abroad.  
                                                 
25 Eurasianet, Uzbekistan’s President Attacks “Lazy” Labor Migrants, June 21, 2013, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/67157, [Accessed April 11, 2014]  
26 Jarayon, Karimov’s Statements May Adversely Affect the Situation of Uzbek Migrants, June 24, 2013, 
http://jarayon.com/en/index.php/migrants-life/item/140-karimovs-statement-may-adversely-affect-the-
situation-of-uzbek-migrants, [Accessed April 18, 2015]  
27 Alisher Ikhamov, Geographic Mobility of Uzbeks: The Emergence of Cross-Cultural Communities vs. 
Nation-State Control, http://www.nbr.org/Downloads/pdfs/PSA/Uzk_Conf06_Ilkhamov.pdf, p 18.  
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RFE/RL reports that Uzbekistan is now the last state in the world to use exit visas 
after Cuba abolished them January of 2013. Reasons for denial are arbitrary and any citizen 
of the country is required to obtain one in order to visit countries outside of the CIS.28 This 
exception is particularly illustrative. 
By allowing Uzbeks to travel within the CIS it is probable that Karimov recognizes 
the economic importance of the remittances from Russia. He knows that it is possible that 
Uzbeks abroad in any CIS country may encounter dissident literature, but this is a necessary 
risk he needs to take in order to maintain economic growth. Additionally, Karimov’s 
relationship with Moscow is not so strained that there is not an at least cordial relationship. 
Once an Uzbek returns from Russia, he is interviewed by the SNB29, the domestic 
security service of Uzbekistan. Through contacts in the FSB, the SNB is able to ascertain 
if a migrant has visited any mosque hosting an Islamist imam. If a migrant has visited such 
a mosque, the SNB will deny the person a biometric passport on return.30 Such passports 
are required for exiting Uzbekistan on any future trips. 
Thus, the Karimov government is openly critical of labor migrants and perceives 
them as an embarrassment to Uzbekistan. Migrants going to work in another country 
tarnish the image of his regime and imply—at least in Karimov’s view—that his 
government is weak and unable to develop an economy that could sustain economic growth 
for its citizens.  
                                                 
28 RFE/RL, Uzbekistan Among Few Countries Keeping Exit Visas, January 16, 2013, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-exit-visas/24834087.html, [Accessed April 18, 2015]  
29 Sluzhba Natsional’noy Bezopastnosti—National Security Service 
30 Moscow Times, Uzbek Migrants Returning From Russia Quizzed over Jihad Fears, Report Says, 
December 15, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=513294 [Accessed April 18, 2015]  
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Labor Migration from Kazakhstan to Russia 
 Compared to Uzbekistan, the economy of Kazakhstan is strong. Indeed, based on 
World Bank figures, the GDP of Kazakhstan average 4.57 times larger than that of 
Uzbekistan31, despite having a smaller population of 17 million. The United States 
Department of Energy states that Kazakhstan is the tenth largest petroleum exporting 
country, between Canada and Norway. Additionally, the country has the third largest 
natural gas reserves in the FSU, after Russia and Turkmenistan.32  
 In terms of energy, Uzbekistan has gas deposits, but the infrastructure for exporting 
these reserves is not well developed. Thus, Kazakhstan has many jobs available in the 
energy sector. However, as the International Monetary Fund states, the oil producing 
regions of the Central Asian state have many opportunities for employment, but rural areas 
still suffer from poverty; despite the poverty rate having declined from 59 to 6 percent 
between 2000 and 2007.33 
 In terms of wages, Kazakhstan’s per capita wage levels are not as high as Russia, 
but they are higher than Uzbekistan. Table 4.8 illustrates how wages in Kazakhstan from 
the years, 2000 and 2005 to 2013 grew. Compared to Table 4.4, Table 4.8 indicates that, 
while the motivation for higher wages may exist among Kazakhs, the situation is not as 
dire as it is Uzbekistan. 
                                                 
31 World Bank, Country Data, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country, [Accessed April 12, 2015]  
32 US Department of Energy, Countries, http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?topL=exp, [Accessed 
April 19, 2015]  
33 International Monetary Fund, Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues, July 2, 2014  ̧




Table 4.8. Comparison of Wages in Russia and Kazakhstan from 2000 to 201334 
 
 That said, in terms of remittances, Kazakhstan is actually in a better position than 
Russia. More precisely, Kazakhstan is less dependent in terms of GDP on money sent from 
Uzbekistan to Russia. Table 4.8 shows that more money is sent back to Russia from 
Kazakhstan than to Kazakhstan from Russia by a significant margin. Additionally, Table 
4.5 indicates that the remittances sent from Russia do not make up a significant amount of 
Kazakhstan’s GDP. However, Since Russia’s GDP is in the trillions of dollars, remittances 




                                                 














Year Kazakhstan to Russia Russia to Kazakhstan 
2010 1,050 210 
2011 1,131 173 
2012 1,031 117 
2014 1,521 133 
 
Table 4.9 Remittances between Russia and Kazakhstan, in millions.35 
 
 Labor migration from Kazakhstan to Russia is lower compared to Uzbekistan. Even 
by official and UN statistics, the number of migrants from Russia to Kazakhstan, and vice 
versa, are generally equal.  Data from the United Nations indicates that there is not a great 















                                                 
35 World Bank, Migration and Remittances Fact Book, 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:2275
9429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html, [Accessed April 19, 2015]  
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1990 2,349,697 2,474,111 131,905 
2000 2,569,852 2,032,833 168,223 
2010 2,512,343 2,270,903 291,678 
2013 2,479,430 2,367,340 304,063 
 
Table 4.10  Migration between Russia and Kazakhstan; and Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan 
according to UN Migration Data.36 
 
 
 Table 4.10 shows the difference between Russia and Kazakhstan varies by 100 to 
150 thousand individuals. There are more migrants from Kazakhstan to Russia in the years 
covered by the UN; however, the numbers do not approach those of Uzbeks going to 
Kazakhstan, which are an order of magnitude lower. When we look at the official numbers 
of Uzbeks traveling to Russia in Table 4.6, the years 2000 and 2010, Rosstat states that 
40,810 and 24,100 Uzbeks immigrated to Russia in 2000 and 2010, respectively. However, 
these numbers are official and not completely accurate. Indeed, these UN migration figures, 
when compared to Rosstat figures of the year 2000, show a difference of 2000%.  
Nazarbayev’s Approach to Labor Migration to Russia 
                                                 
36 United Nations, Trends in International Migration Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin, 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/empirical2/index.shtml, [Accessed 
April 19, 2015]  
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 In light of Kazakhstan’s favorable position relative to Uzbekistan in terms of 
migration to Russia, Nazarbayev is not taking any measures or making any public 
statements which could approach the actions of Karimov. Indeed, in 2013 the president of 
Kazakhstan signed a law that made it easier for Kazakhs to hire domestic help. Previously, 
such labor migrants operated under the table.37 
 One possible explanation for Nazarbayev’s comparatively lax attitude towards 
Kazakhs working abroad is that the migrants do not represent such a significant share of 
the economy as Uzbeks do to their own country. As mentioned previously, Karimov is 
almost self-conscious about Uzbeks going to a foreign country in order to find work. He 
views such migration as a humiliation. By contrast, Kazakhstan does not need to take such 
hardline approaches because the relative size of the population working abroad is much 
smaller than that of Uzbekistan. 
 Another possible explanation for Nazarbayev’s lack of significant public 
statements concerning Kazakh labor migrants is the politics of demographics. Ethnic 
Russians and non-Kazakh-speaking minorities of Kazakhstan make up a significant share 
of the population, as discussed in the second chapter. Making Russophobic statements is 
not politically expedient for Nazarbayev. His political goals are in one way similar to 
Karimov’s: the maintenance of stability. 
 However, the ways in which Nazarbayev and Karimov maintain stability are quite 
different. As I stated in chapter three, Karimov plays Russia and the West off of each other 
                                                 
37 Tengri News, Nazerbaev Podpisal Zakon o Trudovoy Migratsii, December 10, 2012, 
http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-podpisal-zakon-o-trudovoy-migratsii-247062/, [Accessed 
April 1, 2015] 
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and this necessitates the use of  anti-Russian statements. Nazarbayev, however, is cognizant 
of the importance of the Russian minority and needs to ensure that they are not alienated.  
Conclusion 
 The statistical data used in this chapter are not meant to represent an exact picture, 
but they do give an idea of the proportionality of Uzbek labor migration relative to its 
Kazakh counterpart. Wages in Uzbekistan have been significantly lower over the period 
from the years 2000 and 2005 to 2013 as Tables 4.4 and 4.8 show. Simple economics and 
shared cultural characteristics such as a common language make Russia a popular 
destination for workers from Uzbekistan. 
 Remittances from Russia have the greatest impact on Uzbekistan in terms of GDP, 
followed by Tajikistan. The effect of remittances on Kazakhstan is negligible at less than 
0.01 percent of the GDP of that country. Also, wages on Kazakhstan are lower than in 
Russia, but greater than in Uzbekistan. Because of the energy sector, Kazakhstan has more 
opportunities than Uzbekistan.  
 Migrant workers go to both Russia and Kazakhstan. Because of this, Nazarbayev 
does not believe that the low  number of workers (relative to those of Uzbekistan) affect 
the national image of Kazakhstan in the same way that it affects Uzbekistan. Both 
Nazarbayev and Karimov are concerned with the state of their own countries in the 
international system, but because of the lower migration numbers from Kazakhstan, 






 The formation of the modern states of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is inextricably 
linked to the Soviet Union.  These two countries emerged as independent states from the 
Soviet Union; however, their current borders nearly conform to those created by the 
authorities in Moscow. As nation states, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are a result of policies 
implemented in order to promote nationalism among the peoples of the former Russian 
Empire.  
 This is not to say that a sense of ethnic identity did not exist among the Kazakhs 
and Uzbeks before the creation of their respective socialist republics. As noted in the first 
chapter, the Jadids and Alash Orda were instrumental in facilitating the emergence of 
ethnic consciousness among Uzbeks and Kazakhs. That said, the ensuing Civil War that 
resulted from the establishment of the Bolshevik government in Petrograd created political 
tumult in Central Asia and eventually drove both of these social movements into the hands 
of the Bolsheviks. 
 The delimitation of the borders of modern-day Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was 
based on ethnographic and demographic data. This data were in turn used to determine 
where the borders were to be drawn. The primary purpose of state building in Central Asia 
during the Soviet period was to facilitate the growth of nationalism. This nationalism, the 
Bolsheviks in Moscow reasoned, would lead to the development of capitalism, and 
eventually socialism.  
 Language policies were closely connected to border formation. Language, the 
Bolsheviks believed, was tool for the expression of national identity. The standardization 
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of languages such as Uzbek and Kazakh would promote the expression of this identity by 
uniting their speakers. As with border formation, the choice of the state language was based 
on demographics: Demographics dictated which language would be the language of 
education and administration.  
This standardization of language came in the form of the selection of a unifying  
dialect, orthographic reforms, and the modernization of the lexicon for the new age of 
socialism. In the case of Uzbek, the standardization was fraught with complications 
because of the wide variety of dialects spoken in the territory of modern-day Uzbekistan. 
Conversely, the Kazakh language did not face this problem because it was, in general, 
dialectically uniform.  
 Although the paths of language planning diverged in terms of standardization, their 
orthographies were reformed under similar circumstances. Before the Bolsheviks came to 
power, both Kazakh and Uzbek were written in the Arabic alphabet. Both the Bolshevik 
and their local intellectual allies saw the Arabic script as a symbol of cultural 
backwardness.  
 Additionally, intellectuals such as Abdul Fitrat believed that the Arabic script was 
not ideal for phonetically representing Turkic languages. Turkic vowel harmony could not, 
in his view, be accurately represented by the Arabic alphabet and only a new script could 
solve this problem. Therefore, the Latin alphabet was the ideal vehicle for writing Turkic 
languages. This new alphabet would lead to an increase in literacy rates and, therefore, 
cultural progress. 
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 The goal of the modernization of the lexicons of both Uzbek and Kazakh was to 
ostensibly create modern vocabulary for the socialist age. However, the implicit meaning 
of this modernization was to purge these languages of “regressive” elements. That is to 
say, if a suitable word already existed for new socialist ideas, it was eliminated from the 
official lexicon if it was of Perso-Arabic origin as that would signify a backward character. 
 The pattern of language polices in the modern states of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
is very similar to that of the Soviet Union. Both countries have executed language laws that 
are arguably based on population. Both countries have also implemented orthographic and 
lexical reforms.  
 The Uzbek language law of 1989 would have been more amiable to the Russian 
language had the percentage of ethnic Russians in the Uzbek SSR been higher. An Uzbek 
majority ensured that the Russian language did not play a prominent role in the government 
of Uzbekistan.  
 In contrast to Uzbekistan, language laws in Kazakhstan gave the Russian language 
a prominent role. Russian has officially enshrined as the language of inter-ethnic 
communication. This was because Russians and other ethnicities such as Volga Germans 
did not learn to speak Kazakh. Additionally, Kazakhs do not represent a significantly 
higher share of the population of Kazakhstan compared to Russians. 
 Similarly, the orthographic reforms of Uzbek and Kazakh have taken different 
paths. The Uzbek language was Latinized in 2005 and all government websites in 
Uzbekistan are now written in this alphabet. Kazakhstan plans to Latinize, but not until 
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2025. There have not been any indicators as of yet of any implementations of this policy. 
All government websites in Kazakhstan are still in Cyrillic. 
 Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan promoted the lexical reforms of their respective 
languages as a way to move beyond the influence of Russian. Administrative terminology, 
which had been imported from the Russian language, was examined by government 
commissions and all possible attempts were made to adopt suitable Turkic terminology. 
Thus, the lexicons of both Kazakh and Uzbek have been “modernized” since the 1990s in 
terms of the promotion of national identity. This identity is expressed through the adoption 
of Perso-Turkic terminology in order to replace Russian loan words. 
 Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s approaches towards Russia follow the same path 
that they take towards the Russian language. Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia are more 
conciliatory and based on an acknowledgment of Russia’s influence in Central Asia. The 
president of Kazakhstan, like all heads of state, wants to ensure the stability of the state. 
Nazarbayev’s national security thinking dictates that the multi-cultural nature of the 
Kazakhstani state should not be disrupted. The significant Russian minority are influential 
in Kazakhstan and the president knowns that he can ill-afford to antagonize them. 
 However, we cannot say that Nazarbayev believes that Kazakhstan should be 
completely subservient to Russia. As the example of Kyrgyzstan has shown, the president 
believes in the independence of Kazakhstan from Russia. By voting to not allow the CTSO 
rapid reaction force to quell unrest in Kyrgyzstan, he is signaling that he believes that his 
country does not follow every whim of Moscow. He predicted that if he had voted to give 
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these powers to the rapid reaction force, his own country might one day be subjected to 
them.  
 At the same time, Kazakhstan’s membership in the Eurasian Union shows that 
Nazarbayev is a practical politician. He understands that trade deals between Kazakhstan 
and Russia are economically sound for Kazakhstan. However, for Nazarbayev, relations 
with Russia are about far more than real politick. Nazarbayev believes that Kazakhstan is 
part of a Eurasian civilization with European influences. By acknowledging this cultural 
duality, the president can ensure stability based on a cultural synthesis of Russian and 
Turkic elements. He is placating the Russians at home, as well as asserting the 
independence of Kazakh state. 
 Karimov’s approach to Russia deviates significantly from Nazarbayev’s. Russians 
are not a large minority in Uzbekistan. Because of this, Karimov’s relations with Russia 
can be characterized as reflecting the needs of the Karimov regime. That is to say, the 
president’s foreign policy goals are ultimately oriented towards ensuring that he stays in 
power. 
 Uzbekistan’s initial hesitance towards joining the CSTO and deciding to follow the 
United States shows that he wanted to strike out on his own and shy away from establishing 
a regional security regime. Karimov did not want Russia to have the influence in 
Uzbekistan which it could exert through the CSTO. When the United States criticized the 
Karimov government after the Andijon Massacre in 2005, Karimov swiftly ordered 
American troops out of the K2 airbase and joined the CSTO the next year. 
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 The differences between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan concerning labor migration to 
Russia are quite significant. This is particularly true when considering how Karimov and 
Nazarbayev react to the presence of their citizens working in Russia. Their reactions are 
best explained by the economic impact of labor migration on these two countries. 
 Uzbeks are one of the largest labor migrant groups in Russia. Furthermore, the 
remittances sent home to Uzbekistan from Russia impact the economy of Uzbekistan more 
than they do in any other Central Asian state. Karimov views the Uzbeks as a unique and 
proud nation. Karimov believes that Uzbeks should not have to earn money abroad and 
that Uzbekistan should be a self-sufficient state. For this reason, he publically chastises any 
Uzbeks who travel to Russia for work.  
 Kazakhstan, however, does not have many of its citizens traveling to Russia for 
seasonal work. Indeed, the number of Kazakhs migrating to Russia is quite low and there 
are, in fact, quite a few Russian migrating to Kazakhstan for work. This is because of the 
country’s significant energy industry. When we look at the data concerning remittances 
from Russia to Kazakhstan, those numbers are low as well. There is actually more money 
flowing from Kazakhstan to Russia than from Russia to Kazakhstan.  
 Therefore, for Nazarbayev there is no political utility in making Russophobic 
statements. The demographic situation in the country does not allow for it, and there is no 
need. Kazakhstan clearly is in a better economic condition than Uzbekistan due to its 
energy transport infrastructure and reserves.  
 Taken together, language policy, foreign relations and public attitudes towards 
labor migrants are reflective of both demographic trends in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
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Kazakhstan has a significant Russian minority. In order to ensure domestic tranquility, 
Nazarbayev must not make public statements or execute any political moves which could 
be interpreted as Russophobic. He has done this in three ways: First, he has enacted 
language policies that are amicable to the Russian language. Second, his relations with 
Russia are friendly, yet not subservient and indicate that he wants to be the leader of an 
independent Kazakh people. Third, his attitudes towards migrant laborers in Russia are 
positive not only because they are not economically significant, but also because a negative 
attitude could possibly alarm ethnic Russians at home. 
 Karimov’s policies are indicative of both a leader who is playing to his country’s 
demographics, and also one who wants to completely assert the independence of Uzbeks 
as a people. Karimov’s language policies show that the relatively small Russian minority 
did not, in his eyes, play a significant role in his country. His relations with Russia vacillate 
based on the needs of his regime. He does not want Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks to be 
dependent on any country. However, the Uzbek labor migrants are damaging to that image. 
His reaction to the labor migrants indicate that they are humiliating to Uzbekistan; 
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